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TRADE AND INEQUALITY: ECONOMIC
JUSTICE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD
FrankJ. Garcia*
"We turn now to the most obvious problematic of distributive
justice: the income disparity between rich and poor nations, and
all its social,political and cultural consequences. "'
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I. THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY
Economic inequality among states continues to be a challenge for
international trade law in the closing days of the 20th century and the
opening of a new millennium. At the WTO's Third Ministerial Meeting
in Seattle, Washington in the last month of 1999, developed country
hopes for the grand inauguration of a multilateral "Millennium Round"
were dashed by, among other protests, concerted resistance by developing countries to certain elements of the developed world's trade agenda.2
Representatives of the developing world voiced the sense that their con2. Daniel Pruzin, Mark Felsenthal & Gary Yerkey, WTO Seattle Ministerial Fails;
Talks to Resume at a Later Date, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1990 (Dec. 9, 1999) (EC
Commissioner Lamy cites the vigorous new role of developing countries and the Commission's failure to include developing countries that form a majority of WTO membership as
causes of the failure of the talks);. Mark Felsenthal & Gary Yerkey, U.S. Pursuit of Labor
Working Group Meets Strong Resistance From Others, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1995

(Dec. 9, 1999) (developing world strongly opposed formal trade-labor link). See generally
David A. Gantz, "Failed Efforts to Initiate the 'Millenium Round' in Seattle" 17 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 349 (2000).
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cerns and participation were being marginalized, and that those already
holding an unequal share of the world's natural and social resources
continue to receive an unequal share of the gains from trade.3 Such opposition should have come as no surprise. Since the Uruguay Round was
concluded in 1994, commentators have been evaluating the effects on
developing countries of the Round and its progeny, the World Trade Organization (WTO), with mixed conclusions. Some argue that the
WTO's dispute resolution system reflects a victory for the developing
world because the system more fully subjects powerful developed countries to the rule of law in their international economic relations.5
Unfortunately, other aspects of the WTO agreements reveal costly concessions by developing countries, in areas such as agriculture,
intellectual property and investment, in the hopes of securing compensating benefits in other areas.' It is not clear that the gamble has paid off.
The same concerns hold true at a regional level. In our hemisphere,
the neoliberal economic paradigm has resulted in profound tradeoriented domestic reforms by developing countries.7 U.S. hemispheric

3. Id. at 351-52 (need for meaningful inclusion of developing countries in decisionmaking process); OAU Unhappy With Status of WTO Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE SPECIAL REPORT,
12/4/99, <www.insidetrade.com/secure/seattle archive.asp>, ("African
Countries are being marginalized and generally excluded on issues of vital importance for our
peoples and their future."); Message of the Ministers of the Group of 77 to the Third WTO
Ministerial Conference, [3, at <www g77.org/Docs/message wto.html> [hereinafter "G-77
Ministers"] ("The benefits of the existing multilateral trading system continue to elude developing countries").
4. See generally T. N. Srinivasan, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading
System (1998); Note, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the
Promise of Development, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1715 (1995); Bartram S. Brown, Developing
Countries in the InternationalTrade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347 (1994); Michael Rom,
Some Early Reflections on the Uruguay Round Agreement as Seen from the Viewpoint of a
Developing Country, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1994).
5. Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 57; Kofi Oteng Kufuor, From GATT to the WTO: The
Developing Countries and the Reform of the Proceduresfor the Settlement of International
Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 117, 132-140 (1997). However, it has been argued that
differences in economic power will still play a role in the structure and operation of WTO
dispute resolution. See Note, supra note 4, at 1723-27. In this sense, the dramatic increase in
cases against developing countries may be a cause for concern. See Robert E. Hudec, The
New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure:An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 1, 24-25 (1999).
6. Ethan B. Kapstein, Distributive Justice and InternationalTrade, in 13 ETHICS AND
INT'L AFFAIRS 175 (1999) (in advancing their interests, developing countries accepted that
major concessions in areas such as agriculture and intellectual property would have to be
made); see generally Srinivasan, supra note 4, at chapters 5-6.
7.

See generally AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: WHAT NEXT FOR LATIN AMERICA? 1-15

(Lance Taylor ed., 1999) (summarizing move towards market-oriented approach to economic
and development policy in Latin America in recent decades).
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policy mirrors this "trade not aid" philosophy,8 both bilaterally and in the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, 9 thus placing
trade, for good or ill, at the center of Latin America's development plans
for the next several decades.'0
8. The U.S. Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which inaugurated the U.S. move
towards NAFTA and the FrAA, crafted an approach to hemispheric development centered on

hemispheric free trade. See generally THE

ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE: ISSUES
AND PROSPECTS FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (Roy E.

Green ed., 1993); Bush Hails Possibility of Hemispheric Free Trade Zone During South

American Trip, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1824 (Dec 5, 1990). The FTAA continues this
approach; despite a wide-ranging Declaration, the real agenda continues to be trade, an emphasis that has been viewed in different lights by commentators. See, e.g., Stephen Lande &
Nellis Crigler, Consensus in the Americas: Free Trade by 2005, 5 Bus. MEX. 70 (1995)
("Hemispheric leaders succeeded in ensuring a meaningful Summit of the Americas by making trade the centerpiece of the historic December meeting"). But see Summit of the Americas
Questioned by Criticsfor 'Over-Emphasis' on Free Trade, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFF.,
Dec. 16, 1994 available at 1994 WL 2244236 (reporting criticism of Summit countries for
emphasis on free trade over other pressing issues facing the hemisphere and raised in the
Summit documents).
9. The FTAA is the centerpiece of the hemispheric agenda announced at the Miami
Summit of the Americas. See generally Andres Oppenheimer & Christopher Marquis, Free
Trade Giant Set in Motion, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 11, 1994, at 34A; John M. Goshko & Peter
Behr, Western Hemisphere Leaders Agree to Form Free Trade Zone, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
1994, at A 1;David E. Sanger, Chile is Admitted as North American Free Trade Partner,N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at A8. At the Miami Summit of the Americas in December of 1994, all
thirty-four of the Summit participants signed the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action.
See Declarationof Principlesand Plan of Action, 34 I.L.M. 808, 810-11 (1995), available at

<http://www.ftaa-alca.org/EnglishVersion/miami e.htm>. The Summit countries pledged, "to
begin immediately to construct the 'Free Trade Area of the Americas' (FTAA), in which
barriers to trade and investment will be progressively eliminated," with negotiations to conclude, "no later than 2005," and featuring "concrete progress toward the attainment of this
objective.., by the end of this century." Id. at 811.
10. The link between trade and development in Latin America is not new. Free trade and
economic integration, at least in the southern hemisphere, have been cornerstones of Latin
America's political ideology for over-a century. Victor L. Urquidi, Free Trade Experience in
Latin America, 526 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 58, 59 (arguing that integration
attempts began soon after independence). Post-war integration systems were, however, de-

signed around an import-substitution model of trade and development, heavily influenced by
the dependencia theories of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America. See Peter F.
Klaren, Lost Promise: Explaining Latin American Underdevelopment, THE PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES OF CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 3, 14-26 (Peter F. Klaren & Thomas
J. Bossert, eds., 1986) (reviewing the development of dependency theory and its role in Latin
American trade policy); Joseph Grunwald et al., LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
AND U.S. POLICY 26 (1972) (surveying economic rationale for import-substitution based economic integration); Albert 0. Hirschman, Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin
America, LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES (Albert 0. Hirschman, ed. 1961) (reviewing role of ECLA,
its chief writings, and its leading figure, Dr. Raul Prebisch, in formation of Latin American

trade and integration policies). This approach to trade and development failed to generate
much intra-regional trade, or deliver on its promise of an industrialized and economically
independent Latin America ready for open international competition. See Frank J. Garcia,
NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of PiecemealAccession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L.
539, 544 n.17 (1995). It remains to be seen whether the current neoliberal or "Washington
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The problem of inequality between states is a problem in moral philosophy as well as trade law. Moral and political philosophy are
concerned with the order we bring to our social relations, both on the
level of individual decisions and relationships, and in terms of the basic
structure of our social institutions." The problem of inequality in the
distribution of wealth and resources is a basic, yet troublesome, aspect of
social life which theorists have struggled with since the beginning of
political thought. 2 The problem can be analyzed in terms of the distribution of resources within states, or the distribution of resources between
states. Within even quite wealthy states, the problem of distributive justice remains as pressing now as it ever was, with a continuing,
pronounced gap between rich and poor persons."
The problem of inequality acquires an even greater significance
across borders, because the gap between rich and poor states is far, far
wider.' 4 Moreover, the sort of remedial programs implemented
domestically by states to address inequality problems within their
borders are quite underdeveloped at the international level.' Finally, and
perhaps most ominously, the impact of international trade on the fact of
Consensus" approach centered around macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and liberal
trade policies will fare better in the long run. For a critical review of the neoliberal paradigm,
see Tamara Lothian, The Democratized Market Economy in Latin America (and Elsewhere):
An Exercise in Institutional Thinking Within Law and PoliticalEconomy," 28 CORNELL INT'L

L. J. 169 (1995). This Article argues that the success of such an approach will depend in no
small part on the full implementation of special and differential treatment policies.
11. The distinction, never very clear, between moral and political philosophy can be expressed as follows: moral philosophy concerns questions of right action, and political
philosophy concerns that subset of questions involving right action when state power and
authority are involved. See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 6
(1990).
12. See, e.g., Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE, 397-400
(Richard McKeon ed., 1947); see also Alan Ryan, Introduction to JUSTICE (Alan Ryan ed.
1993) (defining the influence of classical treatment of distributive justice on all subsequent
political philosophy).
13. With regard to developed states, Thomas Franck cites Department of Commerce figures from the last census indicating that in the U.S. for example, approximately 14% of the
country lives below the poverty line. FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 413. Looking at developing
countries, the situation is even worse. See, e.g., John Sheahan and Enrique V. Iglesias, Kinds
and Causes of Inequality in Latin America, BEYOND TRADEOFFS: MARKET REFORMS AND
EQUITABLE GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA, 29-61 (Nancy Birdsall, et. al. eds., 1998)
(documenting persistence and extent of marked inequality in Latin America and reviewing
possible explanations).
14. Franck cites statistics demonstrating that in fact the ratio of rich to poor is especially
large, with 23% of the world's inhabitants absorbing a whopping 82% of the world's wealth
as measured by GDP, leaving 77% of the world to divide the remaining 18%. FAIRNESS, supra
note 1, at 413-14. For this reason, Brian Barry argues that the international inequality problem "dwarfs into relative insignifance" the domestic distributive problem. Brian Barry, THE
129-30 (1973).
15. Fairness, supra note 1, at 414-15.

LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE
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inequality is not neutral: the smaller economies characteristic of
developing countries are uniquely vulnerable in trade because of such
inequalities. 6 In other words, international trade exacerbates existing
problems in the distribution of resources, and creates new ones-the rich
can get richer, and the poor poorer.
Since international trade seems destined to serve as the cornerstone
of global economic and social policy, then developed and developing
countries alike must be prepared to evaluate the structure and effects of
international economic law 7 in terms of its basic justice. If the developed world's economic relationship to the developing world is in fact
governed by moral obligation, and not simply by the instrumental calculations of the moment, then there must be a normative framework
within which to articulate the implications of this inequality. Within
such a framework, basic doctrines and policies of international economic
law can be designed and evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in discharging basic obligations of justice, thereby serving both the normative
and pragmatic interests of the developed and the developing world alike.
This Article attempts to lay the foundation for such a framework in
the area of international trade law. More specifically, this Article develops the argument that the principle of special and differential treatment, 8
a key element of the developing world's trade agenda, plays a central
role in satisfying the moral obligations that wealthier states owe poorer
states as a matter of distributive justice. Seen in this light, the principle
of special and differential treatment is more than just a political accommodation: it reflects a moral obligation stemming from the economic
inequality among states.
This Article thus differs from other approaches that ground developing country trade concerns in the discourse of human rights, such as
the right to development. 9 In so differing, this Article argues that
16. As will be explained below, the unique challenges facing developing countries in international trade are best captured by analysis of their status as "smaller economies." See infra
notes 36-53 and accompanying text. For this reason, the terms "small" or "smaller economies" and "developing countries" shall be used interchangeably in this Article.
17. International economic law is a branch of public international law concerned with the
rules governing the economic relations among states and, where relevant, among international
non-state actors. See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc LAW 1 (2nd ed.
1992). International economic law thus includes the law of international trade, international
private investment, international public investment, international currency exchange, etc.
18. See infra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Kele Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations
from the European Union and the United States, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 425, 431-46 (1995)
(discussing trade preferences as part of the right to development); see generally Isabella D.
Bunn, The Right to Development: Implicationsfor InternationalEconomic Law, 15 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1425 (2000).
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wealthy states that consider themselves to be "liberal" societies are, by
virtue of that commitment, already obligated to respond to the problem
of inequality through mechanisms such as special and differential treatment. Further, wealthy "liberal" states incur these obligations regardless
of whether they acknowledge controversial international legal rights
such as the right to development. The argument is thus one of moral
duty on the part of the developed world, rather than of legal right on the
part of the developing world.
The leading contemporary liberal analysis of the problem of inequality is John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, in which he attempts to work
out a justification for inequalities in the distribution of domestic social
goods such as wealth, rights and opportunities. Despite Rawls' own reticence in this regard, commentators have applied Rawls' theory of justice
to international distributive problems as well, with compelling results.20
This Article will therefore examine the problem of inequality in trade as
a Rawlsian problem of justified and unjustified inequalities, and explore
the implications of such an approach for the structure of trade relationships among developed and developing states. In particular, this Article
seeks to go beyond existing treatments of the problem by constructing a
Rawlsian argument for the principle of special and differential treatment.
When viewed as a vehicle for discharging distributive obligations, the
principle of special and differential treatment becomes central for the
justification of inequalities in the international distribution of socioeconomic resources. Seen in this light, current multilateral, hemispheric and
U.S. practice with regard to special and differential treatment must be
reformed in order to bring the practice more fully in line with its moral
underpinnings.
A. Trade and Inequality: A Brief History of the Problem
Trade has always been about inequality among states. In the early
days of trade theory, David Ricardo noted that the principle of
comparative advantage depends upon efficient use of "the peculiar
powers bestowed by nature" on a particular state.21 It is this inequality in
20. See, e.g., Jon Mandle, Globalization and Justice, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 126 (2000); Thomas W. Pogge, REALIZING RAWLS (1989); David A. J. Richards,
InternationalDistributive Justice, in NoMos XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 275
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Charles R. Beitz, POLITICAL THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979). Barry supra note 14, at 128-33 . For an excellent
survey of a variety of theoretical approaches to international distributive justice, and the
problems they raise, see Onora O'Neill, "Transnational Justice," in Political Theory Today,
276-304 (David Held ed., 1991).
21. See David Ricardo,
(emphasis supplied).

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION

93 (1819)
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resource distribution that offers trading states the key opportunity to
specialize in goods and services utilizing their unique blend of factor
endowments. In theory, this should lead to welfare gains for all
concerned, as new wealth is created through economic cooperation. 22
Inequality, however, is not always either benign or beneficent in
trade. In practice, these welfare gains are not equitably distributed: the
rich can get richer, and the poor poorer. This dynamic is amply illustrated by the history of trade and colonization between the Old World
and the New, as described by the noted moral philosopher Adam Smith:
Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over and directed the first project of establishing [the
American] colonies; the folly of hunting after gold and silver
mines, and the injustice of coveting the possession of a country
whose harmless natives, far from having ever injured the people
of Europe, had received the first adventurers with every mark of
kindness and hospitality .... [I]t was not the wisdom and policy,

but the disorder and injustice of the European governments
which peopled and cultivated America.

When [the North and South American colonies] were effectuated, and had become so considerable as to attract the attention
of the mother country, the first regulations which she made with
regard to them had always in view to secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce; to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expense, and, consequently, rather to
damp and discourage, than to quicken and forward the course of
their prosperity."
Europe, richer and more highly-developed, was presented with numerous opportunities for outright predation and conquest, and the pursuit of
other inherently self-serving policies such as mercantilism, in its economic relations with the Americas.
The economic vulnerability in which inequality places developing
countries did not end with colonization. In this century, largely as a

22. See Paul A. Samuelson, ECONOMICS 627 (11 th ed. 1980) (noting that the starting
point for comparative advantage is diversity in conditions of production between different
countries).
23. Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 350-52 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., 1993).

Summer 20001

Trade and Inequality

result of post-war decolonization,2' the role of inequality in economic
relations has become a focus of international economic law.25 In the early
days of post-war decolonization, developing countries found themselves
facing increasingly unacceptable terms of trade for their primary product
exports26 and high tariff barriers to their manufactured goods.27 However,
the immediate post-war period presented developing countries with few
alternatives. They could either work through systems such as the
GATT,28 which they feared would only exacerbate the problem,29 and
whose rules were largely written by the advanced industrialized
countries; 30 or attempt to develop other effective economic fora for their
concerns.
Despite initial attempts by developing countries to influence world
trade rules through the Havana Charter negotiations, the resulting GATT
system's domination by industrialized countries and the GATT's slow
rate of change frustrated these efforts. Thus, many developing countries
minimized their involvement in the GATT and embarked upon
24. See Onyejekwe, supra note 19, at 429 ("As developing countries emerged from colonialism, they called for a new world economic order, complaining that the international
economic order had effectively undermined their development efforts.").
25. See generally id. (surveying the history of the international economic law of development, built around the concept of trade preferences); see also Robert E. Hudec, GATT and
the Developing Countries, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 67 (1992).
26. See John Madeley, TRADE AND THE POR 34 (1992) (arguing that real prices for
major commodity exports have fallen steadily since 1960, with an acceleration in the rate of
decline in the 1980s).
27. See id. at 57 (citing relatively higher tariffs against developing country manufactured
goods).
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
29. See Kufuor, supra note 5, at 120:
"[M]ost of the developing countries joined the GATT at a time in their history
when they were largely suspicious of being integrated into the world economy.
Most of them saw liberalization, and the subsequent opening up of their economies
to capital and goods from the developed world, as a move that would heighten the
inequalities that already existed in their international economic relations."
30. See, e.g., Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principleof PreferentialTreatment in the Law of
GATT: Toward Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trade System, 18 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 291, 294-95 (1987-88):
"For the last four decades GATT has provided the legal framework within which
most international trade between [developing countries] and [industrialized countries] has occurred. Throughout this period [developing countries] have consistently
voiced their disaffection with the GAIT system of world trade. This perception of
GAT' as being unresponsive to the economic needs of [developing countries] is
symptomatic of a more general dissatisfaction with traditional international law
which the [developing countries] view as the normative product of Eurocentric
civilization and which, for most of its existence, has served as the 'white man's
law' and not as the Law of Nations." (footnotes omitted)."
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large-scale multilateral attempts at systemic reform through institutions
such as the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development3' under the umbrella concept of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).32
Attempts to restructure large-small economy trade relationships through
framework treaties or initiatives taken as part of the NIEO, however,
were largely ineffective in addressing developing country concerns.33 As
a result, developing countries again shifted their focus, away from the
U.N. 35system and towards the GATT/WTO system, 34 with uneven results.

B. Trade, Inequality and the Problem of "Size"
Countries are classified according to a variety of categories by various international organizations for various purposes, with typical
classifications focusing on per capita income levels, indicators of development status, and some set of indicators grouped according to the
31. See John H. Jackson, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 275 (1989) (noting that "a number of developing countries, dismayed with rules that had evolved [at the Havana conference],
opted to stay out of the GATT system for years."); see also Onyejekwe, supra note 19, at 446
("Developing countries, frustrated with the gradualism of the GATT, looked elsewhere for
progress. They turned to the UNCTAD."). Developing countries continued to use the principle of special and differential treatment to maintain some pressure in GATT for increased
recognition of their needs. See Hudec, supra note 25.
32. The New International Economic Order (NIEO) was a movement among developing
countries within the United Nations to force a shift in international economic relations away
from structurally disadvantageous policies towards a more equitable relationship between
developed and developing countries. See Declarationon the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715; see generally Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 17,
at 9; Brown, supra note 4.
33. Despite the adoption of the founding resolution and the Charterof Economic Rights
and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1975), the movement and its parent organization, the UNCTAD, have been widely
acknowledged as a failure. Madeley notes that "[t]he story of UNCTAD between 1964 and
1992 has been captioned by its initials," which also stand for "until the next conference try
and delay" or "under no circumstances take any decisions ... Both sum up this trade and
development organization sadly, but brilliantly." MADELEY, supra note 26, at 148. See also
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 17, at 9 (noting that the NIEO cannot yet be said to be
part of international economic law).
34. "Along with this shift [towards open economies], developing countries have
taken another step toward what developed countries have long demanded: active
participation in trade negotiations in the [GATT]. Trade reforms have heightened
the need for market access in a new range of products and increased their stakes in
the system. To further these interests, developing countries have committed themselves, both individually and as members of coalitions, to the round of negotiations
that began in Punta del Este in 1986, the Uruguay Round."
David Glover & Diana Tussie, Introduction to THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD
TRADE, 2 (Diana Tussie & David Glover eds., 1993).
35. See supra notes 4-6 and materials cited therein.
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rubric "size."36 While inequalities among trading partners can be of
many different sorts, with different implications for their economic relationships, one way to begin analyzing the problem is to look at trade and
inequality as a problem of differences in economic "size." While there is
no necessary correlation between the size of an economy, however
measured, and its level of development, it can be said that many developing and least-developed countries exhibit the characteristics of a small
economy. It can also be said that small size is an additional complicating
factor affecting a country's growth, policy options and development potential.37 Moreover, the most recent international body to address the
problem of inequality as it affects trade law, the FTAA's Working
Group on Smaller Economies," adopted economic size as the most relevant measure with regard to the impact of inequality on negotiation of
the FTAA.3 9 Although the Working Group has been superceded by a
consultative forum as part of the transition to the negotiation phase of
the FTAA, its approach and work product have been adopted by the negotiating parties. 4° Therefore, although development status may be more
common or familiar, this Article will follow the Working Group and
adopt "size" as the most relevant measure with regard to the problem of
inequality and trade law.
36. Organization of American States Trade Unit,

OBSERVATIONS ON SMALL ECONOMIES

1 (1995) [hereinafter OAS Report on
Small Economies].
37. Overcoming Obstacles and Maximizing Opportunities:A Report by the Independent
Group of Experts on Smaller Economies and Western Hemispheric Integration, March 1998,
at 2; see Richard L. Bernal, The Integration of Small Economies in the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, 9 CSIS POLICY PAPERS ON THE AMERICAS, Vol. IX no. 1, 6-10 (1998).
38. Prior to the inauguration of the formal negotiation phase, the FTAA process was
supported by seven working groups, including the Working Group on Smaller Economies.
Latin American Institute, Trade Ministers' Conference Reinforces Commitment to Construct
Hemispheric Free Trade Zone, CHRON. OF LATIN AM. ECON. AFF., July 6, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 2297474. The groups were charged with developing actual proposals for
FIAA negotiations in each of their areas and presenting these proposals at the Cartagena
Ministerial. See Officials Urge Work Groups to Name Areasfor First FTAA Results, 2 INSIDE
NAFTA, Dec. 27, 1995, at 1, 19.
39. Report of the Working Group on Smaller Economies to the Vice Ministers, (April 1417, 1997), reprinted in 4 AMERICAS TRADE, May 1, 1997, at 3 [hereinafterInterim Report on
Smaller Economies].
40. The Summit countries initiated the negotiation stage of the FTAA at the Santiago
Summit of April, 1998. See Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago Declaration,April 19,
1998, at <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/English Version/chilee.htm>. This involved a transition
from a working group system to a negotiating group system. See Ministerial Declarationof
San Jose, Fourth Trade Ministerial Meeting, San Jose, Costa Rica, Mar. 19, 1998,
[hereinafter Costa Rican Ministerial Declaration], reprinted in Americas Trade-Special
Report, T 6-8, at Mar. 23, 1998 <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/English Version/costae.htm>. As
part of that process, the Working Group's recommendations were adopted, and the group was
dissolved. See infra notes 271-272 and accompanying text.
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1. Defining the "Small" Economy
A unique definition or concept of a small country does not exist.4'
When considered from a variety of perspectives such as population or
territory, most of the world's countries are small. Looking at population
alone, eighty-seven of the world's 193 states have a population of less
than 5 million, fifty-eight states have under 2.5 million, and thirty-five
states have less than 500,000 inhabitants.42
The smallness of states entails a variety of political and economic
consequences for the global order. When considering trade, the most
important form of "smallness" is economic. In other words, trade is concerned with small economies. There is no absolute definition of a
"small" economy; rather, the definition is relative. In other words, the
smallness of an economy will always be determined in comparison with
other economies. A wide variety of indicators, both quantitative and
qualitative, have been employed in the attempt to develop appropriate
criteria for such comparisons. Leading indicators are population, GNP or
GDP, per capita GDP and per capita income, land area, or some combination of factors.43
The Working Group has adopted self-selection as the appropriate
principle to follow in identifying smaller economies." Therefore, there is
no hard and fast set of criteria for identification of a small economy: a
country can self-designate, and that designation will be deemed conclusive. Nevertheless, in its analysis of the status of smaller economies, the
Working Group did identify population, land size, and GDP as rough
indicators of an economy's human, land and capital resources. 45 No one
factor alone determines the small economy; the factors must be analyzed
in combination. 6 Therefore, this Article will also focus on those factors
and their inter-relation in its analysis of inequality as it relates to trade.

41. See OAS Report on Small Economies, supra note 36, at 1.
42. Bemal, supra note 37, at I (citing Small but Perfectly Formed, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3,

1998, at 65).
43. See Bemal, supra note 37, at 2-8; see generally International Economic Assn. Eco(E.A.G. ROBINSON ed., 1960).
44. This is consistent with the approach taken in the GATr/WTO system, in which
countries are allowed to self-select their own appropriate development status, with LDC status
available only to countries with a per capita income of under 1000 U.S. dollars. Bernal, supra
note 37, at 3.
45. Interim Report on Smaller Economies, supra note 39, at 3.
46. High GDP alone, for example, would not give an accurate picture of the size of an
economy absent population figures. Together these figures yield a GDP per capita measure
which is more accurate than either population or GDP alone.
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SIZE OF NATIONS
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2. Trade and the Small Economy
Smaller economies share certain characteristics that make their participation in the international trading system riskier and more
problematic. The Working Group has compiled a list of economic factors describing the special circumstances adversely affecting smaller
economies as they participate in the global trading system.47 These factors are: small size of population and territory; small size of GDP and
GDP per capita; high dependence on external trade; high level of imports; high degree of vulnerability to fluctuation in world prices and
demand for their exports; high dependence on trade taxes for government revenues; limited human resources and technical expertise; high
unit costs- for infrastructure and public administration; relatively undiversified economic base; small size of domestic markets; heavy reliance
on primary commodities; extreme vulnerability to external shocks; and
vulnerability to natural disasters.4' Together, these characteristics render
smaller economies vulnerable when they participate in trade for two reasons: the relative openness of smaller economies, and the asymmetry
between larger and smaller economies in resources and economic
strength.
When compared to larger economies, smaller economies are generally more open, i.e., external transactions are large in relation to the total
economic activity.49 Openness is one response to the fact that smaller
economies have fewer resources and smaller markets. Smaller economies rely more heavily on external trade than do larger economies, in
part to compensate for problems of scale, such as a narrow range of national resources and the absence of certain types of production owing to
the small size of the market. The size and strength of the market thus
both restrict the range of consumer choices which smaller economies can
independently satisfy, and hamper their efforts to industrialize, expand,
and compete in the global export marketplace.
A high degree of openness by itself is not detrimental; however, one
must consider this openness in connection with other factors common to
smaller economies, such as a relatively undiversified economic base, a
heavy reliance on primary product exports, and a public revenue system
geared towards trade taxes. Collectively, these factors create an acute
vulnerability in smaller economies to fluctuations in world prices for
47. See Interim Report on Smaller Economies, supra note 39, at 18, pt. I, § 2.

48. See id.
49. In this hemisphere three of the largest countries in terms of territory (United States,
Argentina, Brazil) are the least trade-dependent, while the largest in terms of territory, Canada, is one of the least open. In contrast, the Caribbean and Central American states are
almost uniformly high in terms of trade openness. Bernal, supra note 37, at 5. "
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their principal exports and imports, and to changes in levels of protection maintained by important target markets for smaller economy
exports.
This vulnerability is further reinforced as large economies take advantage of their size to target smaller economy markets for larger
economy exports. The fundamental asymmetry in economic and other
forms of power between large and small economies leads to the distortion of trade flows, as the dominant partner succeeds in exporting more
high-end goods to the smaller economies, and the smaller economy specializes further in resource extraction and sub-assembly work.50 The
adjustment burdens of restructuring numerous industrial sectors with
varying degrees of competitiveness and over-employment, a difficult
challenge in any trading system,' are particularly acute for the smaller
economies, whose industries are generally not internationally competitive. Those industries that survive do so with outside investment and
technology and significant downsizing, leading to tremendous social
pressures on domestic governments.
Overall, there is the real risk that the distribution of benefits and
burdens within the trading system will be skewed in favor of the dominant party. 3 Unable to compete in their own domestic markets against
developed country exports, the domestic industries of developing countries will shrivel, producing irreparable harm to the developing country.
C. Trade Policy Toolsfor the Inequality Problem
The primary legal and policy techniques utilized to address smaller
economy trade concerns are the principle of special and differential
treatment and the provision of financial and technical assistance. Together these techniques can be understood as a partial response to the
challenge of developing an adequate trade law in light of the problem of
inequality outlined above. This Article will emphasize special and differential treatment, treating assistance programs only in their subsidiary
50. See Daniel Drache, Triple 'A' Trade: Asymmetry, Access and Adjustment, the In-

flexible Limits of Trade Blocs,

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BETWEEN UNEQUAL PARTNERS

171,

176 (Theodore Georgakopoulos et al. eds., 1994).
51. Id. at 175.
52. Id. at 178-79. One result is that smaller economies are forced to alter their wage and
price structures to match the interests of the dominant partners. Trade systems are at the forefront of efforts to substitute an efficiency-oriented, high employment model for the social
welfare-oriented, full employment model, which has often guided the domestic policy of
smaller and developing economies. Id. at 178-80. Without some sort of compensating regulatory and redistributive mechanism, trade systems cannot deliver on their promises of
increased employment, less expensive goods, and higher standards of well-being. Id. at 183.
53. See id. at 174. See also Garcia, supra note 10, at 539 (analyzing trade and investment
distorting effects of certain integration patterns among unequal partners).
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capacity as facilitating effective use of the opportunities afforded by
special and differential treatment. Before turning io an evaluation of the
normative status and role of these mechanisms, they will first be introduced below.
1. Special and Differential Treatment
The principle of "special and differential treatment" has been a cornerstone of trade between unequal partners since the late 1940s, when
developing countries began pressing their case for more favorable trade
rules.54 From an instrumental point of view, the principle of special and
differential treatment can be understood as recognition of the fact that
while trade theory suggests that the prosperity and development of
smaller economies depends ultimately on trade openness, smaller economy industries are uniquely vulnerable to competition from older, more
established and technologically advanced developed country industries.
As discussed above, unrestricted competition in an unprotected developing country market would have severe effects on developing country
employment and industrialization, ultimately working to the disadvantage even of export-oriented developed country industries, which need
new markets for high-end consumer goods and capital goods. Therefore,
in appropriate cases certain exceptions to trade liberalization principles,
such as the reciprocity of tariff obligations, can play an important role in
responding to these asymmetry problems by eliminating trade barriers to
smaller economy manufactured exports while retaining some protection
for the smaller economy's domestic market.
Under the concept of special and differential treatment, developing
countries benefit from two broad categories of measures: market access
measures providing preferential access to developed country markets for
developing country exports, and market protection measures providing
special protection for developing country markets from domination by
developed country exports. Preferential access mechanisms include unilateral preference programs, treaty-based preference agreements, and
preferential mechanisms built into free trade agreements. Specific market protection mechanisms include the non-reciprocity of tariff
obligations, different levels of liberalization commitments, longer periods for implementing liberalization obligations, expanded application of
the infant industry exception, and exceptions permitting broad application of quantitative restrictions. Both market protection and preferential
54. See generally John H. Jackson,
ANALYSIS

Kale, supra note 30.

GATT: A LEGAL
ch. 25 (1969); Kofele-

WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF

OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE,
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access mechanisms can be found at the multilateral and regional trade
levels.
a. Market Access
The core of market access measures is the preferential access which
lower tariff levels afford for exports from developing countries. Such
preferential treatment can be accorded in a variety of ways, generally
involving limitations on eligible exports and eligible beneficiary
countries.
UNILATERAL PREFERENCE PROGRAMS

Unilateral preference programs are preferences that are not based on
mutual treaty obligations, but on the largesse of the country offering the
trade preference. These programs generally take the form of mutual
negotiations enacted through a statute of the country offering the benefit.
They are preference programs, not free trade programs, because they
generally offer duty- free or reduced duty treatment to only a subset of a
beneficiary's exports, and these concessions are not reciprocal.
By far the best-known unilateral preference program is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). This program has been established
under the auspices and oversight of the GATT/WTO 5 but the preferences are implemented at the state level. The U.S. Generalized System
of Preferences, for example, provides the Executive branch with discretion to award duty-free treatment to certain developing country exports,
but subject to controversial program criteria including a "competitive
needs" exclusion for the most competitive products. 6
The U.S. and Canada administer several other unilateral preference
programs relevant to hemispheric trade. U.S. programs include the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Andean Trade Preference Act
(ATPA), which together provide the best access into the U.S. market
short of NAFTA membership. 7 Treatment under the CBI and ATPA

55. See generally Onyejekwe, supra note 19, at 446-67; Kofele-Kale, supra note 30, at

299-04.
56. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1999), and infra notes 212-236; see generally U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, The Year in Trade: Operation of the Trade Agreements
Program,1997, Pub. No. 3103, at 141 (1998).

57. Caribbean Basin Initiative provides preferential trade status through its trade component, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2707 (1999). The
Andean Trade Preferences Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3202-3206 (1999), creates trade preferences
for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In 1994, 18.3 percent of total CBI imports and 11.6
percent of total ATPA imports enjoyed duty-free treatment under their respective programs,
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programs is more favorable than GSP because more products qualify for
preferential treatment than under the GSP program, and these programs
do not contain "competitive needs" exclusions." However, although the
CBI and ATPA may lack competitive needs exclusions, many of the
most competitive products of beneficiary states are automatically ineligible for preferential treatment. Similarly, Canada's CARIBCAN
program eliminates duties on all beneficiary products except the most
competitive, including leather goods, textiles and apparel, and footwear. 9 Excluded goods are eligible for reduced tariff rates under
Canada's GSP-equivalenti 0
*

PREFERENCE AGREEMENTS

Treaty-based unilateral preference agreements are essentially unilateral preference programs that become the subject of a bilateral treaty
rather than a unilateral program. For this reason, unilateral preference
agreements are more stable and conducive to long-term investment because they are not as easily revoked by the granting state as unilateral
programs.
Historically, one of the earliest and most important systems of
treaty-based preference agreements is the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA),6' which includes a basic framework of regional
concessions and the infrastructure for negotiation of FTAs among its
members. LAIA establishes three types of tariff concessions among its
members: an across-the-board regional tariff preference scheme giving
percentage reductions in national tariffs graduated by the grantor and
grantee's level of development, special non-reciprocal preferences for
LDCs, and the negotiation of special concession agreements, which are

as compared to 3 percent of all U.S. imports under the GSP program. The Year in Trade:
Operationof the Trade Agreements Program,1997, at 126-29, tables 5-2, 5-4, 5-5.
58. See John H. Jackson et al., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1131 (3d ed.,1995).

59. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES TRADE UNIT, TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE
AMERICAS 29 (1995) [hereinafterToward Free Trade].
60. Id.
61. Members include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay,
plus Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia. LAIA, formed in 1980 to succeed the
LAFTA as the "umbrella" association for Latin American integration, was designed to foster
the regional development and creation of a Latin American customs union. LAIA does not
itself seek to become a FTA or CU, however. Lorin S. Weisenfeld, Introduction to Treaty of
Montevideo Establishing the LAIA, in 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 543 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOTT, WESTERN HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 3 (1994).
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limited preferences granted -to another country or set of countries.62
These arrangements are supported by "complementation agreements,"
creating sectoral free trade to benefit intra-industry specialization within
regions and a special intra-regional import credit arrangement to reduce
need for foreign capital in intra-regional trade.63
Outside of the LAIA framework, preference agreements have not
been widely employed in this hemisphere. The United States has generally followed a policy emphasizing unilateral programs over mutually
binding commitments. 64 Other states and integration systems that have
negotiated preference agreements include CARICOM's
preference
66
Colombia.
with
and
6'
Venezuela
with
agreements
- FTAs
Finally, the preferential access component of the principle of special
and differential treatment can be found to a limited extent in free trade
agreements, despite the fact that such agreements envision some form of
preferential access to all members of the integration scheme.
For smaller economies that become members, access is preferential
in comparison to non-members that are beneficiaries of unilateral preference programs. The FTA will usually grant even better treatment across
a wider spectrum of exports and, most importantly, will be in the form of
a binding treaty obligation and not a discretionary program."
With respect to fellow FTA members, treatment is still "preferential"
in the sense that, despite the general expectation of mutuality in trade
liberalization, the smaller economy member will often be granted longer
62. See G. Pope Atkins, LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM
188 (3d ed. 1995); Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the
Americas: "A Work in Progress," 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 493, 497-98 (1994).
63. See generally Daniel M. Ferrere, New Trends in Latin American Foreign Trade: The
LAIA and Its Work, 19 INT'L LAW. 933 (1985).
64. James R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531, 565 (1993).
65. See Toward Free Trade, supra note 59, at 29. After five years the parties will begin
negotiations to make the agreement reciprocal, at which point it will become an FTA. The
Agreement with Venezuela, signed October, 1992, provides duty-free access for some
CARICOM exports into Venezuela.
66. The Agreement with Colombia, signed in July 1994, provides immediate duty-free
treatment for eighty-six percent of Colombia's CARICOM imports. See id. The percentage
will increase to ninety by January, 1998. See id. The parties will negotiate over further preferences and reciprocal concessions from the largest Caribbean countries. See id.
67. This is one reason why Caribbean countries have continued to push for an agreement
giving them NAFTA parity. See, e.g., CentralAmerican Leaders Push CBI Enhancement Bill,
16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1574 (Sept. 29, 1999); Caribbean, Central American Countries
Should Pushfor Parity, Official Says, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2050 (Dec. 2, 1992).
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periods in which to implement equivalent levels of liberalization obligations. However, this is more properly a form of market protection,
discussed below.
b. Market Protection
The WTO agreements as a whole 68 incorporate numerous provisions
based on the principle of special and differential treatment. 69 In the
GATT, the
principle
is found primarily in Article
XVII,inmarket
an artIVprotection
f tte
,70
XVIII, and in Part IV of the treaty, appended to the GATT in response
to developing country initiatives in the mid 1960s.7 ' ,
Under GATT Article XVIII, developing countries meeting the criteria set out in the article can take advantage of a number of market
protection mechanisms. Part A of Article XVIII permits developing
countries to negotiate an increase in bound tariff rates in order to protect
an infant industry.72 Developing countries are also granted an exception
from the general prohibition in GATT Article XI against quantitative
restrictions. Under Part B of Article XVIII, qualifying developing countries are permitted to more liberally employ quantitative restrictions in
cases of balance of payments difficulties.
In Part IV, Article XXXVI.8 incorporates the principle of nonreciprocity of tariff commitments, stating clearly that developed countries do not expect reciprocity for their tariff/NTB reduction
commitments to developing countries.74 The non-reciprocity principle
can be found in other WTO agreements as well."
68. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, LEOF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)

GAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS

[hereinafter WTO Agreements].
69. These provisions are well-summarized in the GATT Committee on Trade and Development in A Description of the Provisions Relating to Developing Countries in the Uruguay
Round Agreements, Legal Instruments, and Ministerial Decisions (COM.TD/W/5 10, Nov.2
1994); see also Organization of American States Trade Unit, Special and Differential Treatment in InternationalTrade 7-18 (1996) [hereinafterOAS Report on Special and Differential
Treatment]; see also Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn C. Atkinson, United States-Latin American
Trade Laws, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 111, 119-20 (1995).
70. GATT, supra note 28.
71. Jackson, supra note 54, at 640-648.
72. GATT, supra note 28.
73. GATT, supra note 28.

74. "The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made
by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of lessdeveloped contracting parties." GATT, supra note 28, Article XXXVI:8. Kenneth W. Dam
has stated that "many would regard [this] as the key provision of Part IV [of the GATr]."
THE GATT 59 (1970).
75. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, for example, envisages less severe cuts in subsidy levels by developing states and does not require cuts by the least developed countries.

WTO Agreements, supra note 68, Annex IA.
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Contemporary FTAs and other regional integration agreements, although premised on reciprocal trade liberalization, also often include
similar market protection mechanisms. Smaller economies are either
permitted to undertake lower liberalization burdens, or are granted an
extended transition period in which to implement mutual liberalization
commitments.76 In the NAFTA,77 for example, there is no express differentiation of Parties according to levels of development, and
liberalization is premised on reciprocity of obligations. Nevertheless,
Mexico was granted longer time periods for implementing its liberalization commitments over more sectors and with regard to more products.
2. Assistance Programs
Economic and technical assistance together form the second critical
component in strategies to deal with inequality in trade. Economic
assistance programs can involve both direct and indirect wealth
transfers.7 ' Direct wealth transfers typically involve public funds, which
can be granted directly to the beneficiary state or transferred to, and
disbursed by, a regional development bank. Indirect wealth transfers can
be accomplished through the facilitation of private transfers in the form
of foreign direct and portfolio investment.
Given the significant adjustment problems facing smaller economies
in connection with trade liberalization, one often finds some combination of these forms of economic assistance in tandem with trade
agreements, supported by the positive transition delays effected by the
market protection aspects of special and differential treatment. However,
such wealth transfers, while undeniably a part of developed-developing
country relationships, are not as central to international trade law per se
as other forms of assistance such as technical assistance, and shall not be
the primary subject of this Article.7 9

Assistance programs can also focus on the provision of technical assistance and financial support for technical assistance, rather than on
general monetary transfers. The field of technical assistance encompasses a wide variety of types of knowledge required by smaller
76. See OAS Report on Special and Differential Treatment, supra note 69, at 19-56
(summarizing incorporation of special and differential treatment in western hemisphere regional trade agreements).
77. See American Society of International Law, North American Free Trade Agreement,
32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafterNAFTA].
78. See generally Anne 0. Krueger, ECONOMIC POLICIES AT CROSS PURPOSES: THE
UNITED STATES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 64-67 (1993) (discussing categorization
foreign aid) (reviewed in Book Notes, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 281,288 (1993)).

of

79. On aid-based redistributive policies, as opposed to trade-based redistribution, see
generally Franck, supra note 1, at 415-25.
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economies to take full advantage of the opportunities afforded them by
trade in general, and special and differential treatment in particular. 0
Smaller economies need specialized expertise in order to negotiate sophisticated trade agreements, understand and implement trade
obligations, harmonize trade-related and other bodies of law, and to
modernize their trade laws and regulatory systems in general. As a rule,
larger and more developed economies are rich in this sort of knowledge,
but both sides need it for trade liberalization agreements to function
properly. Therefore, sometype of, technical assistance involving transfers of such knowledge, and the funds to pay for expertise, is a
recognized component of North-South economic integration, and has for
example been widely employed in European integration.8'

II.

JUSTICE AND TRADE AMONG UNEQUAL ECONOMIES

The problem of trade and inequality is a paradigmatic case of the
link between trade and justice. The' distribution of social goods among
the richer and the poorer members of a society is a central concern of
domestic theories of justice. One of course finds rich and poor individuals outside of one's own society, and one can speak in aggregate terms
of richer and poorer states as well. Following Brilmayer, this Article
takes the "vertical" approach to the moral issues these facts raise,
namely that transnational relations involving inequality, indeed all aspects of transnational relations, require justification in terms of
"domestic" political theory. 2 Thus we look to what has been considered
traditionally as simply domestic political theory, for the normative justification of distributive patterns in which the richer and the poorer are
individuals considered together as states, and not individuals within a
state.
Despite political philosophy's longstanding 'concern with such
matters, the normative implications of inequality are controversial within
the field. Because this Article is aimed at clarifying the moral
obligations of wealthier states, and the preponderance of such states
80. For a representative overview of the field of action, see CTD Secretariat Report on
Technical Cooperationand Training 1998, WT/COMTD/W/62 (May 6, 1999).
81. See Helen E. Hartnell, Central/EasternEurope: The Long and Winding Road Toward European Union, 15 CoMP. L. Y.B. OF INT'L Bus. 179, 212 (1993); Frank J. Garcia,
"Americas Agreements"-An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65, 103 (1997).
82. See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989); see also Frank J.
Garcia, Trade and Justice: Linking the Trade Linkage Debates, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L.
391 (1998) (suggesting international relations raise problems which, by their very nature, are
within the scope of the concept of justice as classically defined by domestic political theory).
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consider themselves Western-style liberal democracies, this Article will
work within the general framework of liberalism, the dominant
philosophical approach to matters of government and society in the West
since the Enlightenment, if not the Protestant Reformation."
A. Liberalism as a Theory of Justice
Liberalism is a notoriously difficult term to define. 4 This article
adopts the approach suggested by Michael Sandel and Jeremy Waldron
and focuses on liberalism as a theory of justice, a'view about the justification of social arrangements. 5 What is most characteristically "liberal"
about liberalism as a form of justification is its assertion that the consent
of each individual under a system of political order is necessary for that
order to have legitimacy.86 This insight can be said to unite the disparate
liberalisms of theorists such as Kant, Mill and Nozick.87 The form which
that consent takes, and the principles consented to, differ according to
the particular strand of liberalism to be considered. This Article considers three: egalitarianism, and to a lesser extent utilitarianism and libertarianism.
A further unifying theme in the discussion of liberalism is the liberal
commitment to "equality," to treating people as equals.8 Following
Dworkin, Waldron has argued that liberalism is more deeply committed
to the ideal of equality than of liberty, rejecting the common view that
liberalism is characterized by an attempt to strike a balance between
these competing ideals. 89 Kymlicka further develops this point into an
approach to liberal theories of justice as attempts to work out, in different ways and to different conclusions, the precise content of the term
"equal treatment." If Waldron, Dworkin and Kymlicka are right, then

83. See John Rawls,

POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv

(1993).

84. Alan Ryan, in the opening paragraph of his essay on liberalism, laments as follows:
"Anyone trying to give a brief account of liberalism is immediately faced with an embarrassing question: are we dealing with liberalism or with liberalisms?" Alan Ryan, Liberalism, in

Goodin and Pettit, COMPANION

TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

291 (1993).

85. Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 128
(1987); Michael J. Sandel, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1 (1998) ("[L]iberalism is
above all a theory about justice .... ").
86. Waldron, supra note 85, at 140.
87. See Ryan, supra note 84, at 304. This normative priority of the individual is also

central to liberal theories of international law. See, e.g., FERNANDO TESON, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998). While this Article develops a liberal theory of trade law based
on traditional domestic political theory, it arrives at a sort of international liberal theory of
trade compatible with the positions taken by liberal internationalists generally.
88. See Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 4-5.
89. See Waldron, supra note 85, at 129, citing Ronald Dworkin's Liberalism in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

(1985).
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liberalism can also be analyzed comprehensively as a theory of justice as
equality, and any individual liberal theory can be critiqued on the basis
of how well it achieves this equality.
B. EgalitarianLiberalism:Rawls' Theory of Justice
If equality is central to liberalism, then the natural starting point in
considering liberal theories of justice is the leading egalitarian theory of
justice: John Rawls' "Justice as Fairness."9 The problem of inequality is
at the heart of Rawls' theoretical enterprise. The principal work in which
Rawls sets forth his response to inequality, the theory of Justice as Fairness, is A Theory of Justice,9 and it is the theory as set forth in that
seminal work which shall be the basis for the treatment which follows.92
1. Rawls and Inequality
Rawls is concerned with the inequalities that arise with respect
to the distribution of primary goods, or goods "that every rational
man [sic] is presumed to want," goods that "normally have a use whatever a person's rational plan of life."93 Primary goods come in two
basic varieties. Social primary goods, such as "rights and liberties,
powers and opportunities, income and wealth, 94 are distributed by
"the basic structure of society, '95 namely its principal social
institutions.96 In contrast, natural primary goods, such as "health and
vigor, intelligence and imagination," are by definition not subject to
90. Perhaps the leading alternative account of egalitarian justice is Ronald Dworkin's
theory of justice as equality of concern, set out primarily in What is Equality? PartI: Equality
of Welfare, and Part II: Equality of Resources, in 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 185-246 and
283-345 (1981); see generally Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 50-55.
91. John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 1972) (hereinafter
"THEORY OF JUSTICE")

92. Rawls updates and expands aspects of this work in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, chiefly as
it relates to the structure of political liberty and discourse. Because the distributive aspects of
justice as fairness are not as central to the latter work, it shall not be directly addressed here.
See supra note 83, at 6-7 (arguing that justice as fairness is the background but not the preoccupation of POLITICAL LIBERALISM). Rawls discusses the applicability of Justice as Fairness to
international relations in THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999 [hereinafter LAW OF PEOPLES], a work
developing the basic argument presented in an earlier essay by the same name. 20 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 36 (1993). Rawls' position in this most recent work is central to the project of this
Article, and will be addressed below in section III.
93. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 62.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 7. Recent critics of Rawls have sought to extend criteria of distributive justice
beyond "the basic structure" to social conventions and personal choices, but Thomas Pogge
maintains that Rawls' limitation remains coherent. Thomas W Pogge, On the Side of DisPHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 137 (2000).
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distribution by the basic structure-they are, in other words, "natural"although their possession is "influenced by the basic structure. 97
In particular, Rawls is concerned with inequalities that arise in the
distribution of social primary goods. Inequalities in the natural distribution of natural primary goods, while they deeply affect people's life
chances, are not themselves the subject of justice; rather, it is how a society responds to such inequalities that forms the basic subject of justice.
The central problematic of justice is that inequalities in natural primary
goods often lead, through the operation of social institutions, to inequalities in the social distribution of social primary goods. 9'
The central moral intuition underlying Rawls' treatment of
inequality is that the inequalities in social primary goods that result from
such social operations are not deserved, since they are deeply influenced
by an underlying natural inequality untouchable by categories of moral
responsibility and entitlement. 99 Rawls' primary concern is, therefore, to
elaborate a theory which "nullifies the accidents of natural
endowment."' ° Put another way, Rawls requires that a liberal theory of
justice be "endowment-insensitive," in order to capture our intuition that
we do not deserve in any meaningful moral sense the advantages or
disadvantages that we enjoy as a consequence of the physical and social
circumstances of our birth.
Rawls argues that as a result, the basic structure of society must be
arranged "so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate. ' ' .°. The distribution of natural talents is to be considered a
common asset, and society structured so that this asset works for the

97. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 62.
98. Inequalities in the distribution of social goods can also result from the degree of effort and ambition we apply to our level of natural resources. This is the problem of ambition,
and Rawls' failure to take adequate account of the role of ambition in distributive justice is
one of the main criticisms raised by Dworkin and others. See supra note 90. Dworkin maintains that it would be unjust to redistribute wealth in accordance with inequalities resulting
from differences in ambition-in other words, that a theory of justice must be "ambitionsensitive." See id.
99. To the extent that inequalities in social primary goods also result from differences in
ambition, and not from differences in natural endowments, such inequalities might be said to
be "deserved." See supra note 98. However, I believe it is fair to read Rawls as referring here
more narrowly to the social advantages which attach to the particular circumstances of our
birth, and not those which we develop in life. In any event, this Article accepts the validity of
Rawls' assumption that arbitrary inequalities in natural primary goods render the unequal
distribution of social primary goods undeserved. It is this assumption, of course, which is the
chief point of contention for libertarian critics. See infra notes 139-143 and accompanying

text.
100. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 15.
101. Id. at 102.
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good of the least well off.'°2 In so doing, Rawls considers this society to
meet the basic Kantian obligation of mutual respect, to treat each other
as ends and not as means.'O Elaborating and defending this view is the
chief task of A Theory of Justice.
ii. Justice as Fairness
The basic structure and conclusions of Justice as Fairness are quite
well-known,3"° so I shall outline them here. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls
articulates the principles that would be chosen by "free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests" in an "initial position of
equality" to define the fundamental terms of their association.'
The
"general conception" of justice as fairness consists of a single central
idea: "All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the
advantage of the least favored.""'
Justice is therefore tied to the notion of an equal share in social
goods. People are treated as equals, however, not by removing all inequalities in social distribution, but by removing only "unjust"
inequalities, those inequalities that cannot be justified in terms of their
benefit to the least advantaged.' 7 Rawls contends that a given inequality,
in income distribution for example, is nevertheless just if it can serve the
interests of the least advantaged by, for example, drawing out a socially
useful talent such as entrepreneurial ability, such that jobs and other opportunities are created for the least favored. Such an allocative scheme,
102. Id. at 179. It can be objected that while Rawls may have established that these talents do not belong to those born with them, he has not really established that they belong to
everyone. To this it can be replied that, as life involves the exercise of such talents, such exer-

cise must necessarily involve an act of appropriation. Thus, the appropriation will either be for
the benefit of the one exercising the talents (as libertarians would have it) or for the good of
others. There is really no other choice. It could still be objected that the relevant community
of others could, for example, be plausibly restricted to one's family or immediate social
group, as coimunitarians might argue. See SANDEL, supra note 85, at 30-31; see generally
Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 160-237. This raises the issue of the boundaries of political

community, a key issue for any contractarian theory. It can be argued in reply that the social
group should be construed to be as large as the cooperative reach of the society creating the
social primary goods and the jurisdictional scope of the social institutions allocating such

goods. See infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text. For the purposes of international
economic relations, therefore, the relevant community would be the world.

103.

THEORY OF JUSTICE,

supra note 91, at 179.

104. For a useful and critical overview see Barry, supra note 14; see also Robert P.
Wolff, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS (1977); see also Robert P. Wolff, READING RAWLS (Norman
Daniels ed., 1975).

105.

THEORY OF JUSTICE,

106. Id. at 303.
107. Id. at 62.

supra note 91, at 11.
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however, entails making a myriad of difficult decisions involving competing principles of distribution, such as efficiency, merit and need.
This general conception is further developed into a system of principles and priorities intended to help resolve such conflicts. The resulting
"special conception" of justice consists of two principles:
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
open to
advantaged ...and (b) attached to offices and positions
8
1
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

It is Rawls' contention that the application of these two principles would
be adequate to assure the implementation of a just overall system of allocation of social primary goods.'0 9
Rawls' argument for justice as fairness depends on a key procedural
device, the so-called "original position."" As Rawls intends it, the
original position is a hypothetical, carefully defined state in which
people with certain stipulated attributes make a single, joint decision
regarding the principles of justice for their future association. The
resulting theory of justice is fair, so the argument goes, because the
conditions under which the original choice is made are "fair." The
constitution of the original position, therefore, becomes of the first
importance for the cogency of the resulting theory.

108. Id. at 302-03. These principles are supplemented by two "Priority Rules." First, the
"Priority of Liberty" states that the principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order, requiring that liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty). Second, the "Priority of
Justice over Efficiency and Welfare" states that the second principle of justice is lexically
prior to both the principle of efficiency and maximization of the sum of advantages. The second principle also specifies that fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle). Id.
109. When supplemented by the two "Priority Rules", these principles form a system of
lexical priority. This priority scheme creates a framework for resolving intuitionist stalemates
between principles of justice. The scheme also ensures that, contra utilitarianism, individual
rights can never be traded away on the basis of the principle of efficiency, which is lexically
inferior both to the principle of equal liberties and the difference principle.
110. Sandel, supra note 85, at 47: "The original position is the fulcrum of the justificatory process in that replace it is the device through which all justification must pass, the place
at which all arguments must arrive and from which they must depart." Rawls' argument also
depends upon his notion of "reflective equilibrium" whereby putative principles of justice are
determined to match our considered moral judgments. See THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 91,
at 48-53. Since the construction of the original position is quite relevant for international
justice and that the process of reflective equilibrium remains the same in the original position,
this Article will focus on the former.
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Key elements of the original position are, first, that it is hypothetical-Rawls is not positing an actual state of nature, nor is he positing an
actual, quasi-Edenic pre-constitutional convention."' Second, the principles are chosen behind a veil of ignorance; that is, the parties in the
original position are ignorant as to the contingent social facts that, afterwards, will determine their relative position in society, with its attendant
advantages and disadvantages. They do not know, for example, their
social status, wealth, natural endowments, or even their individual conception of the good. Third, those in the original position possess certain
qualities. They are moral, in the narrow sense that they have ends that
they value; they are rational, i.e., capable of reasoning in the narrow
sense of judging the means which best suit their ends;" 2 they are mutually disinterested, in that they do not take an interest in each other's
interests (or, put another way, they are not moved by empathy or altruism),"3 and they have a sense of justice. Any decision reached under
these circumstances is fair, according to Rawls, because all are similarly
situated and none can design principles
that will favor his or her situa4
tion beyond the original position."
Out of this original position comes the choice of the two basic principles of justice which form the bedrock of Rawls' theory. Since, in
attempting to work out a system of basic liberties, each person in the
original position does not know under what circumstances they will find
themselves beyond the veil of ignorance, it would be irrational to choose
a system of liberty that gave some a permanent advantage in liberty at
the risk of a permanent loss of liberty, or permitted some to increase
their wealth, for example, at the risk of less liberty. Each person will
therefore choose the maximum degree of liberty consistent with an equal
system of liberty for all, i.e., Rawls' First Principle of Justice, and a priority rule that does not permit liberty to be sacrificed for other social
goods.
Similarly, when faced with a risk of unknown probability that they
will find themselves the most disadvantaged in the natural lottery, those
in the Original Position will maximize the minimum share allocated under the system of primary social goods. The resulting difference
principle, argues Rawls, best expresses this "maximin" strategy, in that

111. Rawls, supra note 91, at 12.
112. Id., at 14.
113. Id., at 13.

114. Id., at 18: "It seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of
principles."
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any justifiable inequality must therefore work to the advantage of the
least well-endowed.
C. Inequality and the Debate Within Liberalism

Liberalism offers at least two other basic approaches to the problem
of inequality: utilitarian and libertarian theories of justice. While utilitarianism and libertarianism are both liberal theories, they differ
fundamentally from egalitarianism in their approach to the problem of
inequality. For the reasons set forth below, this Article suggests that
when contrasted to egalitarianism, both positions fall short of developing
an adequate justification for the economic inequalities that plague developing countries.
1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is a particular form of consequentialism or, as it is
also known, the teleological approach to ethical theory. In general terms,
utilitarianism determines the morality of an act according to its
consequences for the aggregate of individual utility." 5 Utilitarianisms
can be distinguished on the basis of their particular theory of utility, or
value. Historically, utility was defined generally in terms of individual
happiness."6 In classical utilitarian theory, human happiness is identified
as the good to be sought in all actions. If morality consists of
exhortations to do good for people, then an essential characteristic of
moral acts is that they in fact do good for people. The greatest good for
people, to paraphrase Bentham, is to be happy.
"Happiness" has since been generalized into the concept of
"welfare" or "utility," variously conceived of as hedonic satisfaction,
desirable mental states, simple preference satisfaction, or rational preference satisfaction." 7 Modem utilitarians are more likely to define utility

115. This is classical or act-utilitarianism. In rule-utilitarianism, a particular rule is justified by a utilitarian calculus, which rule then in turn constrains particular acts. While the two
approaches differ in important respects, this Article treats them together for the purposes of
the following critique.
116. Jeremy Bentham writes:
"By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of

every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question:
or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or oppose that happiness."
An Introduction to the Principlesof Morals and Legislation, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS
FROM BACON TO MILL 791-92 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1967).
117. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 11, at 12-18.
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in terms of the satisfaction of interests or "preferences,"' 8 which are understood to include a wide range of desired activities, objects and
states." 9 For economists, preference satisfaction generally takes the form
of welfarism, in which the sum or average of resulting individual welfare
levels determines the correctness of an act, principle or policy. 2 ° Essentially, utilitarianism claims that the principle of utility maximization
follows naturally and compellingly from the simple fact that people have
such preferences, and will thus be happier to the extent to which such
preferences are satisfied.,
Historically utilitarian theory was concerned with the problem of
inequality. 2' Both Bentham and Mill considered utilitarian theory to be a
liberal theory precisely because it distributes public voice equally across
social and economic inequalities-each counts for one, and no one for
more than one. Utilitarianism as a theory of justice directs that social
ordering acts and decisions be arranged so as to satisfy as many rational
preferences as possible. Because resources are limited, however, not
everyone's preferences will be satisfied. Utilitarianism therefore counsels that the just social ordering is one in which utility, however defined,
is maximized. Moreover, in determining the utility effects of particular
arrangements, each person's preferences count equally. As reformers,
both Mill and Bentham therefore expected utilitarianism to justify
118. See Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671, 705 (1993).
("[N]o prominent theorist now defends a hedonistic conception of utility. All of the other specifically utilitarian theorists... join economists in taking utility not as an object of reference,
but as an index of preference satisfaction.").
119. See R.G. Frey, Introduction. Utilitarianism and Persons, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS
3, 5 (R.G. Frey ed., 1984) (modem utilitarians tend to adopt "an interest-satisfaction view, in
which 'interests' is a generic term covering a multiplicity of desires or preferences."); See
generally Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 14-15.
120. See Hausman & McPherson, supra note 118, at 704. Utilitarian theorists have further refined preference-satisfaction utility to comprise "rational" or "informed" preferences,
responding to the criticism that not everything we want is of value simply because we want
it-we might, for example, be mistaken or misinformed. Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 14-15.
Nevertheless, preference-satisfaction utilitarianism remains classical utilitarianism, albeit with
an expanded theory of value. Frey, supra note 119, at 5.
121. Mill writes passionately on the problem of inequality:
No longer enslaved or made dependent by force of law, the great majority are so by
force of poverty; they are still chained to a place, to an occupation, and to conformity with the will of an employer, and debarred by the accident of birth both from
the enjoyments, and from the mental and moral advantages, which other inherit
without exertion and independently of desert. That this is an evil equal to almost
any of those against which mankind have hitherto struggled, the poor are not wrong
in believing.
John Stuart Mill, Chapters on Socialism, in 5 COLLECTED WORKS OF J.S. MILL, 705, 710
(1967).
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changes to the existing social,
political and economic systems that would
22
favor the least well-off.
At first blush, therefore, a utilitarian approach to the problem of inequality would seem well-suited to the socioeconomic claims of the
developing world.123 When one considers the levels and distribution of
wealth across both the developing and the developed world, it seems
quite likely that utility maximization will require wealth-transfers to developing countries. There are, after all, many more people in developing
countries than in developed countries,
and 124
differences in marginal utility
,
' '.
calculation.
a
such
in
heavily
in
will weigh
As a theory of international distributive justice, however, utilitarianism runs into trouble.'25 The central problem for a utilitarian theory of
international distributive justice is the problem of standing. When determining the utility effects of a given act, whose utility counts? This
problem has both a formal and a political dimension. Formally, it has
been argued in the cost-benefit literature that the choice of whose preferences to count is underdetermined by utilitarian economic theory,
leaving the matter open to the discretion of the analyst.' 26 In such cases,
cost-benefit decisions involving cross-border externalities may be analyzed without taking into consideration the preferences of those outside

122. With regard to social inequalities, for example, Mill writes that the principle of
utility would clarify the injustice of social inequalities far more than simple consideration of
their social expediency: "So it has been with the distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles
and serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of color, race and sex." John Stuart Mill, UTILITARIANISM, 62.
123. O'Neill cites two other advantages to consequentialist theories of international distributive justice: their sensitivity to harms, and their focus on results. Supra note 20, at 282.
124. O'Neill, supra note 20, at 283 ("Marginalist considerations suggest that any given
unit of resources will be more valued by the poor than by the rich, and so that transfers would
have to go a long way towards an equal distribution of resources before justice was
achieved.")
125. Utilitarian theory encounters several problems as a general liberal theory of justice,
in particular with regard to its consequentialist approach to moral reasoning, the status of
individual rights, and the possibility of incommensurable values. See generally Frey, supra
note 119. These difficulties resurface in international applications of utilitarianism as well.
See Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human Rights
Principle, 25 Brook. J. Int'l L. 51, 70-76 (1999). Other shortcomings to consequential approaches to international distributive justice include "overly pliant instruments of calculation"
leading to multiple inconsistent prescriptions, and their insensitivity to deontological considerations such as the prohibition against treating people as means to the happiness of others,
and the need to prioritize preferences according to a theory of human needs. O'Neill, supra
note 20, at 284.
126. Dale Whittington and Duncan MacRae, Jr., The Issue of Standing in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 6 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT. 665, 666 (1986) I am indebted to D. Don Welch, Jr. for
drawing this literature to my attention.

Summer 2000]

Trade and Inequality

1005

the social unit of the decision-makers, 127 since the basis for any right on
their part to have their preferences counted may be unclear."'28 While
there may be arguments against this view on a theoretical level,'29 there
are strong political reasons why the restricted preference approach may
be favored in practice. Utilitarian economists and philosophers are free
to adopt a global point of view with regard to utility maximization, but
national decision-makers are not likely to do so.3 ° If decision-makers in
developed countries consider wealth redistribution policies along utilitarian lines, they are far more likely to restrict their analysis to the utility
effects on their national constituency."' After all, in a system of nationstates and representative government, national
constituencies are the
2
party to whom such leaders are accountable.1
This restriction dramatically alters the utility calculus and makes it
far less likely that any wealth redistribution will occur, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the world's poor and the undeniably
welfare-enhancing effects of such redistribution. The same social facts
supporting redistribution 'on global utility grounds drastically undercut
the argument for redistribution when standing is limited to the national
sphere. The theory of comparative advantage does suggest that not all
transfers from developed to developing countries will constitute a zerosum game. Nevertheless, there will almost certainly be a relative, if not
absolute, decrease in the welfare of developed countries in order that the
welfare of all states may increase. In such a scenario it is unlikely that
national decision-makers will argue for policies resulting in decreases in
national welfare, whether absolute or -relative, by appealing to the

127. William N. Trumbull, Who Has Standing in Cost-Benefit Analysis? 9 J. POL'Y
201 (1990).
128. Anthony Zerbe, Jr. argues that the standing debate reflects the extent to which
utilitarian cost-benefit analyses depend on legal rights determined outside the theory. Comment: Does Benefit-Cost Analysis Stand Alone? Rights and Standing, 10 J. POL'Y ANAL. &
MGMT. 96 (1991). Where the rights of affected parties are unclear, as in the case of foreigners,
then the standing of affected parties cannot be resolved by the theory alone. Id. at 101. Regardless of which way the standing issue is resolved, the analysis requires recourse to
principles outside of utilitarian theory itself, suggesting that utilitarian theory by itself is inadequate for international distributive problems.
129. Trumbull argues that the Pareto principle requires that the preferences of any affected party be included in the cost-benefit analysis. See supra note 127, at 207-16. However,
Whittington and MacRae question whether this really resolves the issue. Dale Whittington &
Duncan MacRae, Jr., Comment: Judgements About Who Has Standing in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 9 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT 536, 544-46 (1990).
130. Whittington & MacRae, supra note 129, at 544 ("Such a saintly standard is, however, impossibly difficult to achieve for both politicians and other mortals.").
131. Turnbull argues that this is precisely the move that the utility maximization approach leaves open. Supra note 127, at 213-14.
132. Kapstein, supra note 6, at 185.
ANAL. & MGMT
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welfare increases in poorer states and the resulting overall welfare increase.133
In such cases, utilitarians would have to marshal a v.ariety of
domestic utility-based justifications for various types of assistance to
poorer states in order for individuals in richer states to find utilitarianbased redistribution compelling. Such justifications might include an
appeal to increased stability in international relations or to the creation
of larger and stronger markets of consumers for developed country
exports.'34 While these arguments may have merit in their own right, the
degree of redistribution they justify is likely to fall short of the
redistribution justifiable on global utility lines. Moreover, the moral
rationale for addressing the problem of inequality now smacks of
egoism, a questionable moral philosophy even among individuals, let
alone among nations.35
The utilitarian approach to the problem of inequality is also hampered by the fact that inequality for utilitarians is not a special or unique
problem.'36 Inequality is a social fact among many other social facts. In
contrast, the problem of inequality is a central, if not paradigmatic concern for egalitarian liberalism. The goal and standard for any egalitarian
theory of distributive justice will be a principle of justice by which social organization can be adequately justified in the face of inequality,
even if this involves the redistribution of wealth towards, if not absolute
equality of outcomes, then justifiable inequality.

133. For similar reasons Rawls considers it unlikely, as a matter of ideal theory, that

utilitarianism would be chosen as a principle of justice in the original position:
Offhand it hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equals, entitled
top press their claims upon one another, would agree to a principle which may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of
advantages enjoyed by others. Since each desires to protect his interests ... no one

has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a
greater net balance of satisfaction. In the absence of strong and lasting benevolent
impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure merely because it
maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of his own basic rights and
interests. Thus it seems that the principle of utility is incompatible with the concep-

tion of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage.
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 14.
134. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 308-09.
135. See Hausman and McPherson, supra note 118, at 686-88. An egalitarian liberal

approach would in any event reject such utilitarian reasoning, despite any apparent agreement
in outcomes, and argue instead for the existence of an obligation towards the less fortunate

based on moral principles justified deontologically, rather than on an outcome contingent on
the calculation of utility and social facts.
136. See BEITZ, supra note 20, at 127.
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2. Libertarianism
As with egalitarianism, the problem of inequality is central to libertarians-however, they draw opposite moral conclusions from the same
social facts. The classic libertarian-egalitarian conflict involves a fundamental disagreement over the moral legitimacy of state-effected wealth
redistribution, based on a contrary view of the moral implications of
natural inequality. While egalitarians see in the arbitrariness of natural
inequality a justification for 'the difference principle as a condition of
moral equality, libertarians see moral equality as equality of rights, in
particular rights to unequal endowments and their fruits. For libertarians,
this results in a system of social inequalities that, while perhaps regrettable, can justly be addressed only by some minimal notion of procedural
fairness or fairness of opportunity on the part of the less advantaged.
Libertarian theory asserts the fundamental primacy of individual
rights, in particular rights to property broadly conceived. Taking Nozick
as an example, the starting point of his theory, strongly stated at the very
outset of Anarchy, State and Utopia, is that "individuals have rights, and
there are things no person or group may do to them without violating
their rights."'37 For Nozick, the central core of a property right in X is the
right to determine what shall be done with X, constrained only by the
negative rights of others. 38 Each person has ownership rights over themselves and their abilities. Therefore, each person has the right to freely
dispose of themselves and their abilities.
This strong Lockean statement of the priority of individual rights
leads libertarians such as Nozick to approach the problem of distributive
justice in negative terms: "So strong and far-reaching are these rights
that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials
may do. How much room do individual rights leave for the state?"'3 9
Nozick concludes that in fact there is very little room for anything beyond a minimal state enforcing negative rights: "any more extensive
state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and
is unjustified."' ° In particular, there is no room for the sort of distributive project Rawls sees as central to the role of the state: "the state may
not use its coercive
apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to
141
others."'
aid

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See Robert Nozick,
Id. at 171.
Id. at ix.
Id.
Id.

ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA

ix (1974).
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The basis of Nozick's theory of [no-]distributive justice is his entitlement theory, which is a theory about "justice in holdings."'' 1 2 A just
society is one in which everyone is entitled to the holdings.they possess.
Nozick divides the question of justice in holdings into three major topics: justice in the original acquisition of holdings, justice in the transfer
of holdings from one person to another, and the rectification of injustice
in holdings.'4 3 Justice in acquisition is a theory of how unheld things
come to be held.'" Justice in transfer is a theory of the permissible and
impermissible manners of transferring our holdings to others, and
thereby acquiring the previously held holdings of another. 45 Distributive
justice, for Nozick, therefore, is "simply that a distribution is just if' eve46
ryone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution."'
The entitlement theory is fairly, open and underdeveloped. In fact,
the operative core of Nozick's theory is not the general theory of entitlement, but the assumptions underlying the outlines of his theory of
justice in acquisition. Key to Nozick's theory of justice is that natural
endowments are not, in contrast to Rawls, morally arbitrary.'4 7 Natural
endowments are, in fact, morally significant, in that each person acquires
rights in their natural endowments and in the fruits of those endowments. In other words, the theory of justice in acquisition includes
acquisition through natural endowment as a form of just acquisition.
As a theory of liberal justice, libertarianism runs into several difficulties. 4 1 One can object, as does Rawls, on the ground that our
intuitions run counter to the entitlement theory on the key issue of the
moral significance of our endowments. Libertarianism depends on an
individual's moral claim to their talents and the fruits of such talents-if
this claim indeed runs counter to our intuitions, then libertarianism is in
deep trouble. Rawls in effect makes such an argument by asserting that

142. Id. at 150.
143. Id.
144. We come to hold property rights in ourselves and our abilities by virtue of being

born with such rights. Nozick chooses not to elaborate a theory of justice in acquisition for
property we are not born with. However, the indications he does give suggest that he would
follow some variation of the Lockean notion of acquisition through labor. Id. at 178.
145. Nozick's model here is that of the market, or a system of freely bargained exchanges between holders. The principle is historical, in that the transfer must have in fact

come about according to the theory of justice in transfer-it is not enough that it could have.
Id. at 151-52.
146. Id. at 151.
147. Nozick also states that the moral arbitrariness of endowments is at the center of
Rawls' theory. Id. at 215.
148. It is not clear, for example, that the theory of self-ownership does in fact necessitate

a theory of absolute property rights, or justify any particular distribution of resource ownership rights. See generally Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 95-159.
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in the Original Position, libertarian principles would not be chosen, since
they would not under the veil of ignorance be a rational choice.'49
One can also argue that this inconsistency is revealed in the relationship between inequality in resources and effective equality of liberty and
moral status. The central distributive mechanism for libertarians is the
market, since it is in the market that self-owning individuals can parlay
their talents and abilities into title over other resources. However, even if
one grants that the free market is the best mechanism for basic distribution questions, the moral basis for this approach when applied to all
distributive questions is substantially undermined by the reality of inequality in natural endowments. Access to social resources, which enable one to effectively exercise one's liberty and realize one's life plans,
will be skewed by natural endowments, whose distribution the individual had no control over.
For this reason egalitarians consider such endowments arbitrary, and
therefore open to redistributive mechanisms.'5 ° Nozick's primary objection to egalitarian redistribution, however, is that it undercuts formal
self-ownership. Libertarianism, however, fails to address the fact that
purely formal self-ownership without adequate resources to realize one's
life projects undercuts the substance of self-ownership, namely the ability to get on with one's life projects. 5 ' In Nozick's world, only some
individuals are substantively equal, in that they have a reasonably equal
chance in fact of acting on their conceptions of themselves. Such a restriction is fundamentally illiberal.'52 :
This same difficulty arises in the international distributive context:
libertarianism fails to adequately confront the problem of inequality of

149. Moreover, the very centrality of consent in the libertarian scheme underscores
Rawls' arbitrariness assumption: in no way can those ill-favored by the natural lottery be said
to have "consented" to that draw, or to the social institutions which exacerbate such natural
inequalities.
150. As Rawls puts it in his critique of libertarian justice, "Intuitively the most obvious
injustice of a system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly
influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view." THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 91, at 72.
151. Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 120-22. Nozick's commitment to the substance of selfownership and not merely its formality seems clear, for example, in his treatment of Locke's
state of nature. The difficulties which nominally free and equal individuals face in actually
getting on with life in the state of nature become the motivating force for Nozick's theory.
Nozick, supra note 137, at 10-12.
152. The objection that there can be no freedom where two sides are grossly unequal
was already developed in nineteenth century liberal theory. See J. M. KELLY, A SHORT HisTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 306 (1992) (citing the work of T.H. Green and others).
Therefore, the state has a role in setting the basic conditions for a meaningful exchange, a
moral exchange. See id.
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resources in the international economic plane. 53' The reality of gross inequalities in international endowments undercuts the possibility of
effective equality of rights among
states (sovereignty), which is the
4
centerpiece of libertarianism.1
A system of purely formal equality between states, equivalent in the
trade context to a simple system of free open-market exchanges, will
further undercut the possibility of substantive equality between states:
There are several reasons for thinking that [global economic]
interdependence widens the income gap between rich and poor
countries even though it produces absolute gains for almost all
of them. Because states have differing factor endowments and
varying access to technology, even "free" trade can lead to increasing international distributive inequalities (and, on some
views, to absolute as well as relative declines in the well-being
of the poorest classes) in the absence of continuing transfers to
those least advantaged by international trade.'55
If liberalism is to be conceived as a theory of equality, then a libertarian system of "natural liberty" among states, a purely formal equality
of opportunity, will be inadequate to achieve liberal justice absent some
mechanism for addressing the problem of inequality in resources.
III. JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS

For the reasons discussed in the foregoing section, this Article will
proceed to develop a normative framework for addressing inequality
problems in trade based on a Rawlsian approach to distributive justice.
As will be argued below, the socioeconomic predicate underlying the
need for a domestic theory of justice (social cooperation yielding new
benefits and burdens) is present in international economic relations.
Moreover, as has been discussed above in section I, the problem of inequality in natural endowments is as present internationally between
states as it is domestically between individuals, and leads in a similar
153. See infra notes 177-180. For a review of other problems with a libertarian theory of
international justice, see O'Neill, supra note 20, at 289-90.

154. Franck also points out that the current pattern of international holdings is so dependent on prior colonial abuses that it may even fail Nozick's own test of justice in
acquisition. Franck, supra note I, at 20.
155. Beitz, supra note 20, at 145-46 (citing Ronald Findlay, TRADE AND SPECIALIZATION 118-22 (1970)). See also Franck, supra note 1, at 58 (GSP program adopted out of
recognition that simple MFN-based trade "would produce further erosion of the developing
world's share of world trade ....

).
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fashion to inequalities in the distribution of resulting social goods such
as wealth, knowledge and power. For these reasons, this Article argues
that the international ,problem of inequality should be treated in the same
manner as the domestic problem, and with similar results, despite Rawls'
own reluctance to do so.
This Article is not the first work to argue that Rawls' theory of jus56
tice as fairness should be extended to international distributive matters.
Other commentators concerned with distributive justice issues in international economic relations, while acknowledging a debt to Rawls' basic7
theory, have not fully developed its application to international trade.'
Where the role of international trade has been acknowledged, the critical
role that the principle of special and differential treatment plays in justifying inequalities through the terms of market access has not been fully
developed.'58
This section is an attempt, therefore, to suggest what such an elaboration might look like. First, I will respond to objections that might be
raised to the extension of a Rawlsian theory of justice across national
boundaries. Then I will proceed to sketch the contours of an account of
the original position explicitly grounded in the problem of inequality as
it affects international trade, responding in the process to Rawls' own
account in The Law of Peoples. I will first argue that the most likely result of such a choice problem is an international version of the difference
principle. Then I will proceed to analyze the principle of special and differential treatment as a response to this difference principle, emphasizing
the significance of market access as a function of inequality. Finally, I
will evaluate the principle of special and differential treatment as it is in
fact applied in U.S. preferential trade practice, as well as certain aspects
of its application in the WTO and in FTAA negotiations, in order to
suggest how understanding the principle as a part of a just trade theory
might affect both its form and its application.
A. Justice as FairnessAcross Boundaries
As Justice as Fairness is a contractarian theory, it may be argued that
obligations arising from such a theory cannot be extended outside of
national boundaries, and that whatever international justice may be, it
156. See, e.g., Franck supra note 1, at 426-430; Beitz, supra note 20, at 169-76; Barry,

supra note 20, at 128-33; Richards, supra note 20, at 288-93.
157. But see Kapstein, supra note 6.

158. While acknowledging the redistributive role played by GSP, Kapstein does not develop a Rawlsian account of differential market access as the key to the problem of inequality
in trade law, focusing instead primarily on traditional transfer mechanisms. See Kapstein,
supra note 6, at 190.
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will not be justice as fairness. However, this argument presupposes that
national boundaries are coterminous with the boundaries of the relevant
social contract. Put another way, this argument relies on the assumption
of self-sufficiency among states.
This objection gains momentum from the fact that Rawls himself
has steadfastly refused to extend the argument of A Theory of Justice to
international distributive problems, limiting that analysis to what he
posits are closed domestic societies. As Rawls states, "I shall be satisfied
if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the
basic structure of society conceived for the time being as a closed system
isolated from other societies."' 59 Where Rawls does undertake such an
extension in Political Liberalism, it is for the limited purpose of justifying conscientious objection to armed service in times of international
conflict. '°
This failure to extend Justice as Fairness as set out in A Theory of
Justice to its logical transnational application has been criticized, most6
strenuously by parties sympathetic to the basic Rawlsian enterprise.1 1
Although Rawls continues to refuse such an extension in The Law of
Peoples, his reasoning has shifted away from reliance on the assumption
of self-sufficiency16 to an argument that a second, international original
position would not result in a choice of the difference principle. 63 This
Article maintains that both rationales are open to question, and both are
wrong. It is the task of this section to question the first assumption, of
self-sufficiency. A critical examination of his argument based on an international choice problem shall be postponed until section B.
In A Theory of Justice Rawls limits his theoretical enterprise to principles of justice for a closed domestic society. Although Rawls is clearly
working at the level of ideal theory, one can question the degree to
which an assumption of self-sufficiency on the part of domestic societies
is realistic, or even justifiable, and consider the implications for his theory if it is not. Even by 1979 this assumption was being seriously
questioned.'6 Economic globalization, 66 and other developments in international relations generally and in international economic relations in
159. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 8.
160. See RAWLS, supra note 83, at 377-82.
161. See Christopher D. Stone, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 253-62 (1993); Beitz,
supra note 20; Barry, supra note 20; Richards, supra note 20.
162. Rawls does, however, continue both to assume closed societies, and to assume it is
justifiable and useful to do so. See LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 91, at 86.
163. See infra notes 184-192 and accompanying text.

164. See Beitz, supra note 20, at 143-49.
165. For an overview of recent globalization literature, see Garcia, supra note 125, at 52
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particular, have rendered Rawls' positing of domestic societies as closed
societies, if perhaps understandable on the part of an academic philosopher in the early 1970's, certainly not tenable today.'6'
The fact of economic interdependence among the world's societies
is a key element in establishing the possibility of any contractarian argument for international distributive obligations. A primary motivating
force behind the need for justice, according to Rawls, is that some
mechanism is: needed to allocate the advantages that arise from social
cooperation. One can argue, therefore, that wherever social cooperation
has created some wealth or advantage which otherwise would not exist,
the social predicate exists for the application of justice.167 As Charles
Beitz puts it ,inhis seminal study of political philosophy and international law: "[T]he requirements of justice apply to institutions and
practices (whether or not they are genuinely cooperative) in which social
activity produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not
exist if the social activity did not take place.' 68
Trade and international economic relations satisfy this condition because they lead to increases in individual and national wealth through
the operation of comparative advantage and principles of efficiency in
general. As the international trade regulatory system has grown in scope
and institutional capacity with the creation of the WTO, the gains from
such social cooperation increase, as does the institutional capacity for
allocative decision-making and enforcement of resulting norms. 6 9 By
controlling the terms of market access and the enforceability of rights
with regard to investment and intellectual property, for example, contemporary international economic law can be said to create and allocate
166. In his study of the concept of fairness in international law, Franck concludes that
the requisite level of community has emerged at the international level to sustain a fairness
analysis. See FAIRNESS, supra note 1, at 12-13.
167. Put another way, people so cooperating and benefitting thereby, have the requisite

"share in the constitution" for contractarian obligations. Aristotle, supra note 12, at bk. V, ch.
2.
168. Beitz, supra note 20, at 131. Beitz has subsequently limited the scope of this argument from the strong claim that such cooperation makes necessary a global difference
principle (as in Beitz supra note 20), to a more limited claim that such relationships render
such a principle feasible. Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment 80 J. PHIL 591, 595

(1983). In this Article, this argument is used in a similar restricted sense to address the contractarian objection to such a principle, and not to argue for the principle itself. Such an
argument must, as Beitz points out (Id.), be rooted in the moral structure of the original position itself, as will be the case in section B infra.
169. This capacity for enforcement at the WTO level should meet Brilmayer's objection
to Beitz' argument for global redistribution, namely that such obligations, while perhaps desirable, must await the formation of a "superstate" capable of carrying out and policing such
policies. Supra note 82, at 125-26. To the extent that redistributive policies are confined to
special and differential treatment, this Article argues that we need not await a global statethe WTO is perfectly capable of monitoring the implementation of such policies.
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advantages that would not exist but for the cooperation which such
elaborate treaties memorialize and establish.
In this sense, therefore, international economic relations and international economic law can be said to 'involve the creation of benefits
from social cooperation. The need to allocate such benefits raises precisely the same sort of issues that are raised in domestic society when
such benefits stand to be allocated. Therefore, even if there is a justifiable distinction between domestic and international society for some
purposes, with regard to the applicability of justice theory the same basic
predicate is present in both.7
If there are in fact no closed societies in the Rawlsian sense, then
Rawls' own reticence to extend his theory across social boundaries thus
needs reconsideration, particularly in view of the manifest justice problems of the global economic system. In particular, Rawls' distinction
between the choice problem for domestic justice and that for international justice, on which his theory of international justice depends,
collapses.'' If international economic relations establish the necessary
predicate for contractarian obligations, then there is no theoretical bar to
international distributive obligations patterned along Rawlsian principles. Such obligations may indeed require some form of wealth
redistribution across national boundaries, so that inequalities between
states are limited to those which work to the benefit of the least advantaged. 72
B. Generatingan InternationalDifference Principle
A Rawlsian theory of international distributive justice will require
three elements: establishing the facts of inequality, an examination of the

170. Barry objects to the extension of justice as fairness obligations to international society on the basis of such economic relations, questioning whether such relations are in fact
sufficiently reciprocal and dependent. Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in NoMos XXIV, supra note 20, at 232-34. However, in registering this objection, Barry

is responding to the earlier stronger form of Beitz's argument. Id.; see supra note 168. In its
more limited form, Beitz' argument, and the related argument made here, evade this objec-

tion, in that they do not in themselves argue for the necessity of such obligations on the
grounds of such relations, but merely for their possibility. Barry himself notes the continued

viability of arguments for an international difference principle in the face of such objections,
but based on the original position (233-34), as is the case with the argument made in this
Article (see infra section B).
171. Rawls' argument in THE LAW OF PEOPLES depends on two successive original positions, one domestic and one international, with different principles chosen in each case. See

infra notes 184-192 and accompanying text.
172. See Anthony D'Amato & Kristen Engel, State Responsibilityfor the Exportation of
Nuclear Power Technology, 74 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1047 (1988); STONE, supra note 161, at

255-60.
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choice problem faced by those in the original position, and identification
of the principles of justice which result.
1. Inequality in Natural Endowments and Social Goods
As was discussed above, there are many ways to catalogue inequalities in international economic relations. This section will continue to rely
upon the Working Group's list of characteristics of small economies.
Taken together, these factors offer a way of capturing the trade-related
inequalities in natural and social goods that will form the subject of the
Rawlsian analysis.
The characteristics of smaller economies identified by the Working
Group are a complex blend of both natural and social inequalities. Natural inequalities are strongly reflected in smaller economy characteristics
such as smallness in population, smallness in territory, and heavy reliance upon commodities exports, which can reflect both differences in
climate and the narrow range of readily exploitable resources such
economies may have been naturally granted. These natural inequalities
have a common feature, namely that they exist and develop largely independently of the allocative function of domestic social institutions and
international social institutions such as international law and diplomacy. 173
In contrast, social inequalities are essentially connected to social institutions. Social institutions, including the smaller economy's political
and economic systems, and international economic law and diplomacy,
establish patterns of distribution of social goods such as wealth, knowledge, rights and privileges within and between states, which "define
men's [sic] rights and duties, and influence their life prospects.' ' 74 Such
allocations can be deeply influenced by underlying natural inequalities,
and by non-economic factors such as racial, religious or nationalistic
prejudice.
Smaller economy characteristics that reflect social inequalities include their limited human and technological resources, which reflect
both small population and the effects of social allocations resulting in
inadequate educational and research institutions. The small size of the
domestic market reflects both small populations and the effects of employment, colonial economic policies, and domestic wage and
industrialization patterns, including patters of international demand,
market access and the terms of trade. Low GDP and/or low GDP per
173. Although the third factor, reliance on primary product exports, also reflects patterns

of trade and development which are not solely the result of natural endowment, the distinction, I believe, is fair.
174. THEORY OF

JUSTICE,

supra note 91, at 7.
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capita are complex indicators reflecting the interaction of many of the
natural and social inequalities already discussed. Finally, the small size
of the domestic market creates a high dependence on international trade
for both export markets and domestic goods, resulting in a high degree
of vulnerability to fluctuation in world prices and demand for primary
product exports, and changes in market access and the terms of trade.
The key normative assumption underlying a Rawlsian account of
inequality is that differences in natural endowments, and consequent
differences in the allocation of social goods, are unmerited. In Rawls'
terms, they are morally arbitrary.' 75 In connection with the distribution of
natural talents among individuals, Rawls maintains that "[tihe natural
distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that men [sic] are
born into society at any particular position.17 6What is just or unjust is the
way that institutions deal with these facts.'
This assumption holds with equal, if not greater force, with respect
to the global distribution of resources. 7 Setting aside for the moment
issues of migration and conquest," states must in general accept the extent of resources to be found within their territories, and people are
simply born into existing states, the resource levels of which they could
neither choose in advance nor influence. Moreover, as Beitz points out,
two objections commonly raised to Rawls' treatment of natural talents as
arbitrary (that simple possession would seem, at least to the talented, as a
sort of justification for use, and that the development of talents is central
to development of the self), are not even relevant where the "talents"
concerned are natural resources and the developing agent is the state.'79
The fact that a particular state should be favorably situated with respect
to natural resources, and that this fact results in advantages in the acquisition of social goods through the operation of domestic and
international social institutions, does not by itself justify that state's
claim to the benefits arising from that happy fact of geography.
175. Id. at 72.
176. Id. at 102.
177. As Lea Brilmayer, elsewhere a critic of Rawls (see infra note 181), puts it in connection with U.S. wealth: "But we must ask why it is 'our' wealth. The natural resources the
United States enjoys are something of a stroke of good luck; why are we entitled to withhold

them from those in need?" Brilmayer, supra note 82, at 123-24.
178. I would hesitate to conclude that conquest be equated with ambition in terms of
seeking additional resources, and contemporary international law favors territorial sovereignty
and the stability of boundaries in any event. Migration as a people is of course limited as well
by the same principles. It is an interesting question whether or not individuals ought to be
expected to individually migrate to more resource-rich states in connection with the ambitionsensitivity of any distributive theory of justice, but I suspect that due to ties of affinity, com-

munity, and ethnicity it would go to far to require such a move.
179. Beitz, supra note 20, at 138-39.
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Together these natural inequalities, the arbitrariness of their distribution, and their social consequences, form the subject of international
justice. The task .ofinternational justice is to furnish principles that will
serve both as a standard for evaluating the social response to natural inequalities, and as a guide to social institutions
....
180for making distributive
allocations that will justify social inequalities. Those principles are to
be chosen in the original position.
2. The International Choice Problem
For Rawls, the problem of choice of principles is articulated in terms
of the "original position," in which representative individuals must
choose principles that will govern their future social relations under
conditions of limited knowledge of the general human condition, and
ignorance as to their particular future socioeconomic situation. When the
choice problem is one involving the choice of principles governing
states, then the representatives are present on behalf of nations whose
future intercourse will be governed by.the principles chosen by that assembly.' 8' As Rawls puts it: "One may extend the interpretation of the
original position and think of the parties as representatives of different
nations who must choose together the fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among states."' 82
The choice problem they face is, mutatis mutandis, identical to that
faced in the domestic variant of the original position:
180. I am setting aside the argument that, given the colonial history which has deeply influenced the economic development of smaller economies and the framework of international
institutions, there are grounds to argue for a redistribution of resources under principles of
corrective, as opposed to distributive, justice. This argument, while it merits serious attention,
would be both fact-specific and limited to what redistribution might be characterizable as
reparations, and thus would not yield a general duty. See Brilmayer, supra note 82, at 119-20.
181. Rawls has been criticized for this "statist" assumption, as failing to take into account the evolution of contemporary international law to recognize non-state actors, including
individuals. See Lea Brilmayer, "What Use is Rawls' Theory of Justice to Public International
Law?" forthcoming in 6 INT'L LEGAL THEORY (2000); Fernando Teson, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998), at chapter 4. This second original position could be modified to
include, for example, representatives of significant NGO's and international institutions, or, as
Beitz and Pogge suggest, collapsed into the first, thus forming a single cosmopolitan original
position. However, this Article will proceed along Rawlsian lines and argue in terms of a
second "statist" original position, for it seeks to illustrate that, even closely following Rawls'
original approach, one is led to an international difference principle. In order to argue that this
degree of "statism" is not illiberal, however, as Pogge suggests that it is (supra note 20, at
252), I am assuming that advantages from the mutual cooperation of states pass through to the
individuals in those states. This assumption is certainly questionable in the real world, but I
believe it is defensible at the level of ideal theory. It does suggest, however, that the actual
justice of the international economic order also depends upon "domestic" or "internal" distributive justice as a condition of its liberalism, but that is a project for another day.
182. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 378.
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Following out the conception of the initial situation, I assume
that these representatives are deprived of various kinds of information. While they know that they represent different nations
each living under the normal circumstances of human life, they
know nothing about the particular circumstances of their own
society.... Once again the contracting parties, in this case representatives of states, are allowed only enough knowledge to
make a rational choice to protect their interest but not so much
that the more fortunate among them can take advantage of their
special situation.'83
Uncertain as to which position they will occupy beyond the veil, the
representatives know only that natural and social goods are necessary for
the realization of domestic cooperative schemes, that inequalities of the
sort discussed above exist between states, and that such inequalities are
highly correlated with resulting differences in wealth and other social
advantages enjoyed among states.
3. Principles of International Justice as Fairness
Under those conditions, following Rawls' logic in A Theory of Justice, the representatives will choose principles of justice which maximize
the minimum bundle of social goods they are likely to receive in the face
of life's inequalities.'84 In the domestic context, the representatives chose
two principles, a principle of equal liberty and a principle of distributive
justice. As our task in this Article is to analyze distributive problems, it
is the choice of the second principle, the difference principle, that will
concern us.
As has been set forth above, the problem of inequality and the
choice problem faced by representatives of the international community
are present internationally as they are in the case of domestic society.
Given the similarity in social facts and their consequences as well as the
identical constraints inherent in the original position, the most logical
conclusion is that the same principles would be chosen. As has been argued by Beitz, Barry and others, "There is no reason to think that the
content of the principles would change as a result of enlarging the scope

183. Id.
184. Rawls argues that the most rational course for the representatives to follow, given
assumptions of moderate risk-aversion, is the so-called "maximin" strategy, in which they
choose principles which will guarantee them the maximum social primary goods possible if
they happen to be born with the minimum distribution of natural primary goods. THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 152-57.
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of the original position."' 85 If it is to be argued that different principles
are in fact more likely to be chosen, then the onus is on the one so arguing to justify that choice with reference either to differences in the social
facts or differences in the reasoning which representatives would follow.
It is curious that although in The Law of Peoples Rawls does in fact
conclude that the choice problem would not result in similar principles,16 he fails to justify this conclusion with reference to either different
social facts or different reasoning. Instead, he simply relies on the fact
that he assumes as a starting point the existing content of international
law, which does not include a difference principle, and casts his project
as the development of a justification for these principles.' Now, this
bears a superficial resemblance to his "rational reconstruction" in A Theory of Justice of our moral intuitions on liberty and equality, but the
resemblance is only superficial. In arguing for the difference principle,
Rawls advocates in the earlier work for the adoption of a principle of
justice which, while it might reflect our moral intuitions, clearly goes
beyond existing laws and policies in its redistributive implications.
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls fails to distinguish between the extent
of a plausible set of current widely-recognized norms of international
law, and the extent of our moral intuitions regarding international moral
obligations. The two might be identical, but it cannot be assumed so."'
Moreover, the extent of criticism Rawls has received and continues to

185. Stone, supra note 161. See also Beitz, supra note 20, at 151; Barry, supra note 20,
at 128-32; Richards, supra note 20, at 292; D'Amato & Engel, supra note 118.
186. With particular reference to the difference principle, Rawls argues instead that
states would choose a limited duty of assistance, obligating them to assist "burdened" states,
states which lack the resources to establish basically just domestic institutions, with the resources and assistance necessary to establish such institutions. LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note
92, at 106. Once such institutions are established, Rawls concludes that the duty of assistance
ends.
The role of the duty of assistance is to assist burdened societies to become full
members of the Society of Peoples and to be able to determine the path of their
own future for themselves. It is a principle of transition ... for each burdened society the principle ceases to apply once the target is reached.
LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note

92, at 118-19.

187. "I consider the merits of only the eight principles of the LAW OF PEOPLES
listed [earlier]. These familiar and largely traditional principles I take from the history and usages of international law and practice. The parties are not given a menu
of alternative principles and ideals from which to select, as they are in POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, or in A THEORY OF JUSTICE."
LAW

OF PEOPLES, supra note 92, at 41.
188. Rawls does rather categorically -"contend that the eight principles of the Law of
Peoples are superior to any others," but he does not really evaluate this claim or argue for this
superiority with reference to prior moral principles, nor does he even set out why these principles reflect our moral intuitions on the subject. LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 92, at 41.
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receive for rejecting the difference principle in international justice is at
some level evidence of at least disagreement over the content of such
international moral intuitions." 9
The compelling logic of the domestic original position and the
similarity of its circumstances and constraints with the international
original position are powerful arguments for the obvious conclusion: that
some form of a difference principle would also be chosen in the
international original position. Conclusions to the contrary demand a
reasoned argument. However, in explaining his failure to do so in his
earlier essay on the subject, Rawls states that the difference principle,
and other aspects of justice as fairness not carried forward, "are not
needed for the construction of a reasonable law of peoples, and by not
assuming them our account has greater generality." '9' Given the
centrality of the problem of inequality to domestic justice as fairness,
this brief explanation has been justly criticized as leaving much to be
desired.' 9'
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls takes greater pains to respond to
claims that the arguments for a domestic difference principle are just as
cogent in an international original position, but his response continues to
be dissatisfying. Rawls equates such arguments with a cosmopolitan vision of liberalism necessitating "global justice for all persons" rather
than the "foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people" towards
other societies of liberal and non-liberal but decent peoples.' 92 Such a
move, argues Rawls, would result in a duty on the part of liberal peoples
to work to shape all non-liberal societies in a liberal direction, which
assumes illegitimately that we know already that decent non-liberal societies are not acceptable. Thus, it would be better to proceed "from the
international political world as we see it,"' 93 and identify principles of
toleration appropriate to a world including decent non-liberal states.
This argument reinforces the conclusion that in The Law of Peoples
Rawls essentially sidesteps the problem of inequality at the international
level, focusing instead on basic political rights and liberties, their prior189. In describing the task of the representatives in the second original position, Rawls
states that they "simply reflect on the advantages of these principles of equality among peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives." LAW OF PEOPLES,
supra note 92, at 41. While this may describe Rawls' own approach, the objections of Pogge,
Beitz, Barry, Richards and others would suggest that the representative might not in fact be so
sanguine about the status quo. See, e.g., Pogge, supra note 20, at 246 ("I am at a loss to explain Rawls' quick endorsement of a bygone status quo.").
190. Essay, supra note 93, at 43-44.
191. See Franck, supra note 1, at 18-19 (Rawls' objections to so extending his theory
not "convincing.").
192. LAW oF PEOPLES, supra note 92, at 82-83.
193. Id. at 83.
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ity, and their effective enjoyment as extended to international society.'94
It is important to note in this regard that Rawls' argument does not address the global inequality problem at all, but the problem of toleration
for non-liberal societies. I would attribute this elision more to Rawls'
preoccupation with the international implications of political liberalism
with regard to human rights and the toleration of non-liberal societies,
than with a considered conclusion that the problem of inequality is, beyond a limited duty of assistance, irrelevant to international liberal
justice.'95 One can readily imagine an international original position
yielding both principles of appropriate toleration for decent non-liberal
societies and an international difference principle. Although such a view
might be even more consistent with "the international political world as
we see it", Rawls does not do take this step.
Rawls may be helped towards this position by his underdeveloped
view of the international trading system.' 96 Rawls argues that, "assuming
fair background conditions," the principle of justice chosen by representatives in the original position to govern international economic
relations would be free trade.' 97 While this may in fact be so, Kapstein
has argued persuasively that free trade alone is inadequate as a principle
of justice for international trade, and that states would also choose a
principle of diffuse reciprocity to address inequality problems.'98 Rawls
makes a gesture in this direction in noting that free trade alone in the
current world could result in "unjustified distributive effects," but he
seems to fail to grasp the fundamental implications of this fact, namely
that international economic relations and international trade law are social institutions creating and intensifying the same sorts of inequalities
-that such institutions affect domestically, with the same normative implications.
For these reasons, this Article will continue its argument with the assumption that an international difference principle is the logical outcome

194. See Pogge, supra note 20, at 244 ("Principles of international law which Rawls
chooses to rely on are "wholly insensitive to distributional concerns."). While acknowledging
the fact of inequality in international relations, Rawls attributes the inequality principally to

the absence of just domestic institutions, advocating a limited duty of assistance enabling
burdened societies to establish such institutions. See LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 92, at 108109.
195. It seems to me unlikely that Rawls would adopt such a position, and this Article

can be understood as an argument that such a position would be a serious mistake.
196. As noted above, Rawls has been criticized in general for maintaining a view of international law which has been superceded by contemporary developments. Brilmayer, supra
note 181.
197. LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 92, at 42-43.
198. See Kapstein, supra note 6, at 189-90.
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of an international original position, and turn towards the nature of such
a principle and its effects.
The initial form of the resulting international principle of distributive justice might look something like this:
International social and economic inequalities are just only if
they result in compensating benefits for all states, and in particular for the least advantaged states.
So stated, this formulation paraphrases Rawls' earliest statement of
the second principle of justice.' 9 Such a principle is the logical outcome
both of the fact of inequality and the condition of the original position.
As Rawls puts it:
Once we decide to look for a conception of justice that nullifies
the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance as counters in quest for political and economic
advantage, we are led to these principles. They express the result
of leaving aside those aspects of the social world that seem arbitrary from a moral point of view.2°°
According to this difference principle, inequalities in economic and
social goods, heavily influenced as they are by arbitrary natural inequalities, are unjust unless they work to the benefit of the least
advantaged state. The social and economic consequences of the inequalities identified in the smaller economy studies are therefore not just,
unless the international economic law system is designed to ensure that
these inequalities work to the advantage of the smallest economies. '
Where inequalities are not working to the benefit of the least advantaged, then the more favored states are under a duty to effect some form
of reallocation of social goods until such inequalities are rendered justifiable. What might such a mechanism look like? It might involve wealth,
199. See Rawls, supra note 91, at 14. I am choosing this form of the principle because
this extension to the international setting is at a similarly initial stage. Throughout A THEORY
OF JUSTICE

Rawls further refines the precise formulation of the second principle in relation to

particular concerns; a similar elaboration of this formulation of the international difference
principle will have to await a later day. For example, I am postponing an examination of the

international equivalent of the notion of fair equality of opportunity, which is critical to
Rawls' later formulations of the difference principle. I will also not attempt here to deal with
the problem of differences in "ambition" as a factor in resulting differences in social goods
which may not be morally arbitrary, though Dworkin seems right in maintaining that a principle of distributive justice should be both "endowment insensitive" and "ambition sensitive."

See Dworkin, supra note 90.
200. Rawls, supra note 83, at 15.
201.

Accord Pogge, supra note 20, at 242 ("Taken seriously, Rawls' conception of jus-

tice will make the social position of the globally least advantaged the touchstone for assessing
our basic institutions.").
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or it might involve the rights, privileges and obligations that create the
basic framework of social institutions such as international economic
law. It is the task of the next section to begin to work this out.
C. The Difference Principleand Trade
With Smaller Economies
As was discussed above, the global distribution of natural resources
is manifestly unequal. This fact of inequality in natural resources leads,
through a complex variety of domestic and international private and
public actions and institutions, to social inequalities, inequalities in
wealth, privileges, rights and opportunities. Together, these inequalities
do not work for the benefit of the least advantaged states-quite the reverse. Smaller economies are the most vulnerable to adverse changes in
their trade, in the global economy, and in the international economic law
system. Thus, they face the most obstacles to economic development and
effective competition.
In view of these facts, Justice as Fairness presents a very basic question to states in their international economic relations: given the fact of
inequality and its adverse effects for the least advantaged, how can the
international economic system be reformed to ensure that such inequalities work to the benefit of the least advantaged?
Perhaps the most obvious and, on its face, simplest, answer may also
be the most problematic: why not just redistribute the wealth outright?
Certainly, wealth transfers must on their face be considered as potential
elements in any international redistributive theory 2 However, redistribution in the form of significant wealth transfers between richer and
poorer states has a controversial and enigmatic history.20 ' Despite decades of active international development aid, it is not clear that such aid
programs result in the increased welfare their architects envision.
Moreover, there is a strong sentiment, at least in the US, in favor of the
neoliberal "trade not aid" approach.
For these reasons, and because the present work is focused primarily
on trade law and not development in general, the normative arguments
for development aid as a form of redistribution will not be discussed in
any detail, except as they relate to trade-related technical assistance. Instead, this Article will focus on international trade law itself as an
avenue for the partial fulfillment of the redistributive obligations that
202. See Kapstein, supra note 6, at 190 (discussing centrality of transfer mechanisms for
international distributive justice); Bernard Cullen, PhilosophicalTheories of Justice, in JusTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 28 (Klaus R. Scherer ed., 1992) (hypothesizing that

justice might require a non-discretionary system of interstate development aid).
203. See, e.g., Krueger supra note 78, at 18-35 (surveying history of international aid).
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Justice as Fairness dictates for wealthier states in response to inequality
and its effects on the least advantaged states.
Once the basic principles of justice have been identified, the next
step according to Rawls is "to choose a constitution and a legislature to
enact laws, and so on, all in accordance with the principles of justice
initially agreed upon. '2 °" In the case of international economic relations,
we already have the equivalent of a constitution and a legislature, albeit
imperfect ones, in the GATT/WTO system. 205 Moreover, the international economic law system already incorporates principles and policies
that can function as redistributive mechanisms and that, in normative
terms, can therefore serve as the basis for a just international trade law:
the principle of special and differential treatment, and the related practice of technical assistance.
The following section begins with an evaluation of the principle of
special and differential treatment as a response to the problem of inequality. Specifically, the principle employs asymmetric trade
liberalization to secure the benefit of developed country wealth and resources for the least advantaged states through non-reciprocal market
access. In this way, special and differential treatment plays a key role in
justifying inequalities in the international allocation of social goods. The
section concludes with a brief examination of the role of technical assistance and technical assistance funding as part of a redistributive
theory of international trade law.
1. Justifying Inequalities Through Special
and Differential Treatment
As was discussed in section I, the principle of asymmetric or preferential treatment for developing countries (a practice as old as the GATT
2 °6
system) is a principal instrument in managing inequality problems.
Normatively, the principle of special and differential treatment can be
understood as a partial attempt to justify inequalities along Rawlsian
lines. Historically, of course, it was not so situated, being rooted in postcolonial, even Marxist, rhetoric on the part of developing countries, and
limited utilitarian arguments (system stability, future markets, etc.) on
OF JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 13.
205. On the constitutional and law-making function of trade institutions, and their short-

204. THEORY

comings in this regard, see Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International
Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398 (1996-97).
206. The Havana Charter contained extensive provisions detailing preferential treatment

for industrializing developing countries. See Brown, supra note 4, at 358-59. Unfortunately,
the Havana Charter never went into force; the resulting GATT had a much weaker regime for
developing countries. Further, the amendments adding part IV, in 1966, did not fully remedy
the situation. See id. at 359.
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the part of developed countries. Nevertheless, the principle is at its core
a redistributivist one, and has an important role to play in any Rawlsian
trade scheme. Moreover, understanding it as a Rawlsian principle has
important consequences for the normative evaluation of its current iteration in U.S. trade policy, and for its future development in multilateral
and regional trade policy.
a. Inequality and the Role of Market Access
The key to understanding special and differential treatment as a
Rawlsian tool for justice is in understanding the way many of the natural
and social inequalities among states translate into the relative strength of
consumer markets and producer groups. States that are rich in natural
resources and have developed significant social resources such as
wealth, industrial capacity and technology, will generally have as a
result a strong consumer market, as manifested in per capita income, and
a strong producing base, as manifested in per capita GDP. States that are
poor in resources will generally have a weak consumer market,
manifested in low per capita income, and a weak producing base,
manifested in low per capita GDP.
This means that market access becomes a key variable in any attempt to address inequalities through trade law. Market access is
managed through the two principal components of special and differential treatment, market access preferences and market protection
mechanisms. These two legal tools therefore play a key normative role
in justifying inequalities.
i. Market access
Market access is a central component of trade theory under any scenario, because it is in open markets that the principle of comparative
advantage can operate. However, in a redistributive context, open markets take on additional significance. By opening their markets to
developing country exports on a preferential basis, developed countries
in effect place their larger, richer consumer market at the service of the
developing country, which can increase its exports and thereby
strengthen its economic base. Thus market access for developing countries allows the inequalities that manifest themselves in rich consumer
markets to work to the benefit of the least advantaged, thereby meeting
the central criteria for distributive justice.
However, preferential access will itself create a form of social
inequality, as the goods from beneficiary countries will enjoy rights
and privileges not similarly enjoyed by the goods from nonbeneficiary countries. Put another way, preferential access violates the
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most-favored nation principle (MFN), a cornerstone of international
trade law. Third-party states and their producer groups could object,
therefore, to the legality and fairness of such arrangements.
In terms of these arrangements' legality, this violation of MFN by
GSP and related programs has been authorized by a GATT waiver. °7 In
terms of their fairness, which is a question of justice, this inequality is
under Rawlsian principles a justified inequality. Recall that the difference principle requires that inequalities in the allocation of social goods,
such as tariff preferences, work to the benefit of the least advantaged.
Preferential access meets this requirement, in that the preference works
to the benefit of the recipient country, in the manner outlined above. The
inequality is, therefore, justified as fair."8
ii. Market Protection
Now, market access can work as a redistributive mechanism, but
only if several conditions are met. Chief among these is the principle of
asymmetry or non-reciprocity of obligations, or as it has been called, the
principle of diffused reciprocity. 2° If preferential access is a response to
the inequality of consumer markets, then diffused reciprocity is a response to the inequality of industrial production capacity.
Full reciprocity of liberalization means that the inequalities that
manifest themselves as differences in markets and in producing capacity
will continue to operate to the detriment of the poorer state. As discussed
above, the fundamental asymmetry in economic and other forms of
power between large and small states leads to the distortion of trade
flows, acute adjustment burdens, and an unequal distribution of benefits
and burdens of trade. 210
Despite these effects, the principle of full reciprocity may be attractive to libertarians as a principle of justice, since it is most consistent
with the libertarian formulation of equal liberty. As discussed above,
however, libertarian theory does not so much address the problem of
distributive inequality as perpetuate and justify it. 2t ' Egalitarians argue
that, while the fact of natural inequality may be morally neutral, resulting social inequalities are not; nor is the moral pull of social inequality
207. In 1971, the GATT Contracting Parties approved a waiver authorizing, but not requiring, developed states to extend preferential tariff rates to developing country exports on a
non-reciprocal basis for ten years. In 1979, the waiver for the resulting GSP was made permanent. See id. at 362-63.
208. It is interesting to note, therefore, the normative role of the GATT waiver in formalizing the justice of the preferential access scheme.
209. Kapstein, supra note 6, at 189.
210. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 149-155 and accompanying text.
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exhausted by a theory of just acquisition. Moreover, any theory of just
acquisition would have to wrestle with problem of colonialism, mercantilism and related economic predations by developed countries, which
are deeply embedded in the acquisition of property, wealth, and rights by
the developed world. Since even libertarians accept a redistributive
mechanism when it comes to correcting unjust acquisitions, such implication would inevitably enmesh the libertarian in the same messy sorts
of redistribution that the egalitarian requires.
For this reason, market protection mechanisms must be a part of a
redistributive approach to trade. In order for this to occur, there must be
a deliberate inequality in the treatment of developing countries regarding
market protection. Currently, the principle of non-reciprocity takes several forms. Developing countries may negotiate disparate obligations,
i.e., their concessions need not mirror the concessions they receive from
developed countries. 2 Alternatively, the level of concessions may be
identical, but developing countries need not liberalize as quickly, i.e.,
they are granted longer implementation periods. Currently, the U.S. follows the practice of negotiating, where possible, equivalent obligations
with disparate time-tables, and where necessary negotiating equivalent
obligations but permitting special, enumerated exceptions. 23
With regard to the debate over disparate obligations versus longer
implementation periods, one can advance instrumental or normative arguments in support of either side. Advocates of equivalent obligations
may have strong formal and instrumental reasons for this view. After all,
there is something intuitively, even aesthetically, appealing about an
agreement in which both sides undertake the same commitment, albeit at
different rates. Such an agreement may be easier to sell politically, easier
to police, and may guarantee eventual full reciprocity more readily than
new negotiations aimed at more closely approximating mutual obligations.
However, advocates of this view should bear in mind the Aristotelian insight that treating unequals equally is just as fully an injustice as
treating equal parties unequally. Resolution of this question may well
depend on further economic and game theoretic analysis as to which
method is superior in terms of achieving free trade. However, it is important that the issue be studied normatively as well, in case unequal
212. An example of this approach would be the NAFrA services agreement, in which
the principle of full reciprocity of liberalization of trade in services is abandoned by use of

exceptions, permitting Mexico to open its sensitive financial services sector only a little bit,
and slowly.
213. Examples of the former in NAFTA would be manufactured goods liberalization, in
which, as part of an FTA, both Mexico and Canada are committed to a zero tariff regime.
However, Mexico has a longer implementation period for most of its commitments.
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treatment in level of obligation might in fact work more to the benefit of
the least advantaged than simply longer implementation periods. If so,
then justice as fairness would require inequality of obligation as well.
As was the case with preferential access measures, market protection
measures can be criticized as themselves a form of inequality. Here the
source of the challenge is not third parties, but producers in the liberalizing state, which do not receive the same level of market access as their
state has granted to producers of the beneficiary state. However, as with
preferential access, the inequality is both legal and just. It is legal, because as was discussed above the principle of non-reciprocity is an
established GATT rule in trade negotiations and relationships between
developed and developing countries. It is just, because it is consistent
with the difference principle: the inequality in allocation of social goods
(here again market access) works to the benefit of the least advantaged
state.
2. Technical Assistance and Unjustified Inequality
As discussed above, the key to understanding the principle of special
and differential treatment as a policy for achieving distributive justice is
to see market access as a significant factor in both inequality and its justification. In other words, by placing developed country markets at the
service of small economy exports, and by protecting developing country
markets from the superior competitiveness of large economy exports,
special and differential treatment creates social inequalities that benefit
the least advantaged.
Technical assistance and technical assistance-related financing address another aspect of inequality, namely that of trade-related
knowledge and the resources needed to pay for such knowledge. States
need sophisticated expertise to modernize their trade regulatory systems,
comply with complex trade agreements, and in general capitalize on the
opportunities which trade liberalization, and special and differential
treatment in particular, make available. Absent some mechanism to assist in the acquisition of such knowledge, the principle of special and
differential treatment by itself will be inadequate to ensure that inequalities work to the advantage of the least developed.
A libertarian response to this problem would not extend beyond determination that the knowledge was justly acquired-if so, then it would
be the property of those in possession of it. However, the result would be
that the inequality of knowledge would continue to hamper development
of the smaller economies and their effective equality. Moreover, there
are strong utilitarian arguments to be made for technical assistance.
Where expertise is part of successfully implementing trade agreements,
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and such trade agreements stand to benefit large economies as well, then
it is in the interest of all parties to provide the technical assistance required for harmonization, implementation and modernization problems.
Whether for egalitarian or egoistic reasons, the obvious conclusion
would seem to be that technical expertise must be shared on terms that
make it economically possible for smaller economies to access such expertise. If this knowledge has an economic significance, as it does, then
justice as fairness would require that such knowledge be shared in such a
way that the least advantaged will benefit. The question then becomes
one of means.
One approach would be to offer such assistance for free, as a form of
wealth transfer. To the extent that such expertise exists within relevant
branches of government, it can be made available on an
intergovernmental basis. Development-oriented international organizations, such as the Inter-American Development bank, may also possess
the requisite expertise and therefore can provide it as part of their
mandate. It is often the case, however, that such expertise is in the
private sector, including attorneys and industry groups. Government
programs can be established to facilitate the exchange of technical
expertise, and to pay the relevant private party provider directly.
Alternatively, funds can be made available for development loans
through which smaller economies can themselves pay for the requisite
expertise. This would require either establishing specialized institutions
to facilitate both the transfers and the financing of such expertise, or
creation of new loan facilities within existing development banks specially earmarked for technical assistance.
3. The Framework of Just Trade Through
Special and Differential Treatment
In the foregoing sections, this Article has sought to argue several
related propositions: first, that trade law must be just; second, that such
justice requires liberal states to ensure that inequalities in social resources among states be justified according to some form of the
difference principle; and third, that market access is the key to this justification, therefore giving the principle of special and differential
treatment a central role in the justice of the international trading system.
But how should the principle of special and differential treatment in
fact be implemented to achieve this normative goal? Current applications of the principle have been subject to a variety of political
constraints and conditions, as will be discussed below. Are such conditions justifiable or acceptable from a normative perspective? In other
words, at what point do the vagaries of implementation of the principle
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of special and differential treatment imperil the justice of the trading
system? These are the questions that the next section will explore, with
reference to existing unilateral and multilateral applications.
IV. ADDRESSING INEQUALITY THROUGH BILATERAL, REGIONAL
AND MULTILATERAL TRADE POLICY

Under current law, application of special and differential treatment
is essentially bifurcated. Preferential market access is primarily handled
unilaterally in GSP programs, through which WTO members grant market access preferences in their trade relations with one another. Second,
market protection mechanisms are incorporated throughout regional and
multilateral agreements such as the WTO agreements and the FTAA currently under negotiation, which also raise the issue of technical
assistance. A full assessment of the operation of special and differential
treatment must, therefore, evaluate its implementation at these two levels.
The difference principle is both a tool for the evaluation of existing
distributions and a guide for constructing future distributive schemes. In
this section, this Article applies the framework developed above to current U.S. preferential trade practice, as an example of the unilateral
implementation of the key market access component of special and differential treatment. This section also notes two other issues raised in the
WTO and in the emerging framework for hemispheric integration
through the FTAA: the importance of effective asymmetry of implementation period, and adequate access to technical assistance.
In so doing, two basic conclusions emerge. First, application of the
principle of special and differential treatment at the national level is particularly vulnerable to instrumental manipulations by the granting state,
and succumbing to such temptations undermines the basic character of
the principle as an instrument of justice. In U.S. preferential trade practice, incorporation of the principle of special and differential treatment is
so imperfect as to call into question whether one can say that, from a
normative perspective, the principle is in fact operating at all.
Second, where special and differential treatment is applied in an international agreement, formal recognition of the principle is inadequate:
the agreement must be structured so that the principle can in fact work,
taking into account the actual needs and circumstances of smaller
economies for adequate transition periods and technical assistance.
Compared to U.S. trade practice, both the WTO agreements and the
FTAA negotiations appear to more adequately incorporate relevant as-
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pects of special and differential treatment at a formal level, but both fall
short in key aspects of effective implementation in ways that threaten the
normative justification of those trading systems.
A. U.S. PreferentialTrade Practice

If the nature and extent of market access is understood as a key variable in discharging obligations of justice, then this has important
consequences for the form that the principle of special and differential
treatment takes. This is particularly evident if one examines the current
form of unilateral trade preference programs in U.S. hemispheric trade
policy. Until the FTAA is implemented, and for the foreseeable future if
it fails, it is U.S. trade policy which will determine the justice of economic relations in this hemisphere. Thus, current U.S. practice with
respect to special and differential treatment will need substantial modification if such policies are to achieve their normative aims.
1. Justifying Unilateral Trade Preferences
Much of the trade between developed and developing countries is
conducted under some form of unilateral trade preference program. Most
developed countries have some form of GSP program, including members of the European Community and the United States.2 4 Preferential
trade between larger and smaller economies in this hemisphere has also
been conducted within regional preference programs such as the U.S.
CBI and ATPA and Canada's CARIBCAN 2 5 Such programs have several key features that are suspect from the perspective of a theory of
international justice as fairness: unilateralism, the exclusion of the most
competitive goods, and conditionality.
a. Unilateralism
Instrumentally, trade preferences extended through unilateral programs are questionable on several grounds. First, they are inherently
unstable, because as programs they are subject to periodic renewal and
the beneficiaries must continually re-qualify for the preferences. This
creates problems for business and investment planners on both sides of
the preference. 6 In addition, the uncertainty surrounding both periodic
qualification decisions and decisions concerning continuation of the
214. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C.§ 2461 (1999).
215. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Colombian Exporters Fear Loss of Tariff Benefits in War on Drugs, 13
INT'L TRADE REP. 204 (BNA 1996) (Colombian private sector concerned that, given U.S.
political climate, narcotics allegations against Samper government could force Clinton to raise
tariffs, with disastrous consequences for legitimate export-dependent businesses).
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program, has understandably led to criticism on the part of beneficiary
countries that they remain in dependent relationships subject to the whim
of the granting state.1 7
Even more significantly, the difference principle as applied to international trade suggests that as a matter of basic justice the unilateralism
of existing trade preference programs must be reconsidered. Policies or
practices now considered to be discretionary on the part of the implementing state may in fact be obligatory when understood as the
consequence of a moral obligation of the granting state to its trading
partners. If, as this Article has argued, there is a moral obligation that
international inequalities be justified according to the difference principle, and if market access is the key to such justification in trade, then
special and differential treatment is no longer optional. The difference
principle would require that a just trading system maintain special and
differential treatment on a permanent basis, unless of course the underlying facts of inequality change or an even more effective justificatory
mechanism is found.2 8
If a state has a moral obligation to place the strength of its consumer
market at the service of the least advantaged states, then it is difficult to
justify the view that such service should be discretionary at the sole will
of the richer state. One can envision an instrumental argument to the effect that rendering such treatment discretionary creates useful leverage
for moving the recipient towards other goals, some of them perhaps
laudable in their own right." 9 Even aside from the morality of coercion
217. See Argentina, Peru Presidents to Pressfor Trade Liberalization, Integration, 13

206, 207 (1996) (Peru's President Fujimori considers system of U.S. certification tied to narcotics record a 'sword of Damocles,' citing fear that U.S. misperceptions
INT'L TRADE REP.

will deny certification despite good faith efforts); see also Colombian Exporters Fear Loss of
Tariff Benefits in War on Drugs, 13 ITR 204 (BNA 1996) (legitimate Colombian businesses
fear increased tariffs due to U.S. presidential politics would be 'cutting off your nose to spite
your face;' U.S. is Colombia's major trade partner and holds largest share of Colombian for-

eign investment).
218. Kapstein goes so far as to argue that the principle of diffuse reciprocity is itself a

principle of justice, and would be chosen in the original position to govern the distributive
aspects of trade. Kapstein, supra note 6, at 189-90. This Article takes a slightly different

approach to the same conclusion, arguing that the principle of special and differential treatment, while not itself a Rawlsian principle of justice in the way the difference principle is,
nevertheless is required as a consequence of the difference principle, if economic inequalities
among states are to be justifiable under a theory of justice as fairness, and market access
functions in the manner suggested by this Article. This approach does leave open the possibility that the principle of special and differential treatment could be rendered superfluous if
the facts of inequality change, or be superceded by another even more effective mechanism,
should one be developed. In the latter case, however, it is important to remember that the

effectiveness of such a mechanism must still be judged by the difference principle.
219. This argument comes up even more forcefully with respect to the conditionality aspects of trade preference programs. See infra notes 228-243 and accompanying text.
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based on need,220 this argument maintains, in effect, that withholding or
threatening to withhold performance of one's moral obligations is a legitimate means to influence behavior, which is certainly suspect from a
moral point of view. Moreover, the instrumental criticisms of the current practice, such as its uncertainty and the problems this creates for
business, render the utility of the policy as an effective redistributive
tool doubtful. Finally, establishing the principle of special and differential treatment on discretionary grounds has the effect of casting an
obligation of justice as an offering of charity.
Instead, justice as fairness requires that such discretionary unilateral
preferences be transformed into nondiscretionary bilateral treaty commitments for preferential treatment. This echoes recent calls by
developing countries for developed countries to broaden and strengthen
special and differential treatment practices by committing to permanent
duty-free 222
access to essentially all exports from the least developed
countries. Unfortunately, recent U.S initiatives in this regard do not go
far enough because the proposed concessions would not be in the form
of binding commitments, thus maintaining for the U.S. the option to rescind such preferences at any time. 22' However, in no event should
special and differential treatment simply be terminated, or its termination
threatened or subject to threat, for political reasons having to do with the
interests of the granting state.224 Unilateral preference programs freely
terminable by the donor state in this manner are not morally justifiable.
b. Exclusion of Competitive Goods
Preference programs tend to disfavor exports of manufactured goods
that are directly competitive with the manufactured goods of developed

220. The coercive aspect of existing U.S. preferential trade practices will be discussed
below. See infra note 239.
221. At a minimum this would seem to run directly counter to the categorical nature of
the Kantian imperative underlying justice as fairness, if not liberalism itself. See THEORY OF

supra note 91, at 25 1-57.
222. G-77 Ministers, supra note 3, at para. 7; Tenth United Nations Conference on

JUSTICE,

Trade and Development, Plan of Action, TD/386 (18 February 2000), paragraphs 58, 132.
223. "Clinton Announces General Commitment for More LLDC Initiative But Final
Details Delayed," Inside U.S Trade (December 2, 1999)(www.insidetrade.com/seccgi/as-web.exe?SECITl 999+D+496222).

224. See Note, supra note 4, at 1725 (unilateral non-binding nature of preference programs serves interests of granting, not beneficiary states). Circumstances surrounding the
failure of the previously mentioned U.S. initiative and the subsequent scuttling by the Administration of equivalent World Bank and IMF proposals suggests that it is, in fact, domestic
political considerations which underlie the continuing need for an easy exit. "U.S. Resists Bid
to End Tariffs for 3rd World," New York Times (April 9, 2000) at A]; "Clinton Announces
General Commitment for More LLDC Initiative But Final Details Delayed," supra note 222.
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states to some degree. Such restrictions significantly undercut the expected economic benefits of such programs.226 Moreover, under the
theory of justice as fairness, such exclusions would seem to run counter
to a state's moral obligation to structure its trade preferences in the best
interests of the recipient state.
Under the difference principle, inequalities are to be justified by
their working to the advantage of the least favored. If special and differential treatment is to accomplish this justification, then preferential
treatment must be structured to further the interests of developing country exporters, not developed country competitors. The U.S. GSP
program fails this requirement in two ways: first, by categorically excluding certain categories of goods as "import-sensitive", and second, by
virtue of the so-called "competitive need" exclusion.
The U.S. GSP statute explicitly limits the range of articles that may
be designated as eligible for GSP treatment by excluding those articles
deemed "import sensitive. 227 Import sensitivity is determined according
to the effects that the category of articles might have on U.S. industry if
granted duty-free access. 28 To begin with, this form of exclusion is
flawed from the perspective of economic theory, in that it is tradediverting.229 Trade theory suggests that, where developed and developing
country exports compete against one another under duty-free conditions,
the one that is the most efficiently produced emerges as the most competitive, and production shifts in its favor are welfare-enhancing. Rather
than encourage such shifts, which would also of course aid the exporting
developing country, the import-sensitivity exclusion obstructs such
shifts by re-subjecting the developing country export to the artificial
competitive disadvantage of the tariff, thus refusing to permit competition on equal terms and favoring the less-efficient domestic producer.

225. Despite its widespread implementation, the GSP effort is widely judged a failure, as
most often the exports of greatest interest to developing countries are not covered, and the
complexity and discretionary nature of the program undermine its utility. See generally
Brown, supra note 4, at 362-63. Sadly, the Seattle Ministerial confirmed that developed
countries continue to be just as committed to such exclusions when considering further preferential access, potentially a great boon to smaller economies. See "Seattle Ministerial Fails,"
supra note 2; WTO Members Bicker Over Seattle Initiative to Aid Poorest Countries, Win
Their Support, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)(I 1/17/99) (reporting that industrialized countries

continue to balk at full preferential access to LDC exports because of sensitive sectors such as
textiles).
226. Hudec, supra note 25, at 72.
227. 19 USC § 2463 (c)(1).
228. See, e.g., 19 USC § 2463 (b)(1)(B) (exempting from import-sensitivity watches
deemed not to cause material injury to the U.S. watch industry).
229. For an overview of trade creation and trade diversion generally, see Garcia, supra
note 10, at 553-57, n.68 (1995).
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Moreover, from the perspective of justice as fairness, the import
sensitivity exclusion is truly perverse, in that it turns the moral justification of the trading system on its head. Rather than structure the trading
relationship for the benefit of the least advantaged partner, the import
sensitivity exclusion deliberately structures the -relationship in favor of
the less-competitive domestic industry. Thus rather making the trade
relationship more just, the import sensitivity exclusion operates to make
,it less just, by creating a further inequality in social primary goods
through the selective retention of tariff barriers.
In contrast, on its face the competitive need exclusion could be argued to meet the requirements of the difference principle. The ostensible
justification for excluding goods which reach a certain level of competitiveness 23 ° is that the preference should be made available to the country
most in need of it, and that once exports from one recipient reach a designated level
of competitiveness, the preference should "shift" to another
2
recipient.
On closer examination, however, this justification falls apart, as the
exclusion is based on the competitive concerns of the granting state, and
not the best interests of beneficiaries. There is, of course, a tradediverting aspect to this exclusion as well, in that economic theory suggests that under terms of equal competition (here equal preferential
treatment) production should shift in favor of the most competitive good,
whereas the exclusion operates to restore the higher MFN tariff for that
good. However, the most damaging aspect of the competitive need exclusion is that it in fact operates to protect developed country industries,
which turns the moral justification of the trading system on its head.
This rationale is revealed in the waiver provisions that apply to the exclusion: rather than condition a waiver on the effects that continued
equal preferences would have on the market access of other developing
country exports, the waiver in fact is conditioned on a finding that continued preferential access would not adversely affect U.S. interests.232
In moral terms, therefore, existing U.S. exclusionary practice runs
counter to the requirements of justice as fairness. There is no justification under the difference principle for restricting preferential access in
order to protect domestic industry from the most competitive developing
country exports."'
230. Determined under 19 USC § 2463 (c)(2) with reference to shares in the U.S. market.

231. John Jackson & William Davey, THE LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS 1161 (1986).
232. 19 USC § 2463(d)(1)(B).
233. In fact, the structure of the exclusionary waiver suggests the sort of policy which
might be arrived at under a "restricted-utility" analysis excluding the utility of foreigners,
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c. Conditionality
A third problem raised by the current form of preferential access
policies is the problem of conditionality. In addition to subjecting the
general availability of these preferences to the discretion of the granting
state, actual availability of the preferences at any given time is often
subject to conditions imposed by the granting state. Such conditions are
offensive to developing country recipients4 and often have nothing to
do with the moral predicate for such measures in the first place, namely
the needs of the recipient. In this sense, special and differential treatment
becomes an instrument of economic coercion, rather than an instrument
of distributive justice.235
A case in point is the U.S. program of hemispheric unilateral preferences, administered under the GSP, ATPA and the CBI.116 Together
these three programs share certain questionable conditions. First, all
three programs require that the beneficiary not be a communist country. 237 This is a U.S. geopolitical requirement wholly irrelevant to the
moral obligation to grant preferential market access.
Second, all three programs undercut the principle of non-reciprocity
by conditioning the preferences on assurances by the beneficiary that it
will provide the U.S. "equitable and reasonable access to the markets
and basic commodity resources" of the beneficiary 2 and by requiring
that the beneficiary will not grant preferences to other developed countries which are found to hurt US commerce. 239 These conditions entirely
reverse the normative thrust of the policy away from the benefits to the
developing country and towards the effects on the developed country.
further underscoring the inadequacies of utilitarianism as a theory of international justice. See
supra notes 126-135.
234. G-77 Ministers, supra note 3, at para. 12 ("The preferential trade access granted to

some of our countries continues to be tied to conditions not related to trade. We believe that
these harmful practices, which conflict with WTO rules, should be eliminated.").

235. Brilmayer suggests that one precondition to the existence of an affirmative duty of
aid on the part of states is that the recipients of such aid be subject to its coercive power. Supra note 82, at 123. For this reason, she reaches the ironic conclusion that closer attention to

domestic political theory may in fact undercut claims for transnational economic assistance.
Id. at 134. While not agreeing with her conclusion, I would suggest that the coercive aspect of
current special and differential treatment practice demonstrates that such aid itself can render

its recipients subject to the coercive power of the donor, thus weakening the force of her conclusion.
236. See supra notes 46-49.
237. GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b)(2)(A); CBI, 19 U.S.C §2702 (b)(1); ATPA, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3202 (c)(l).
238. GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (c)(4); CBI, 19 U.S.C §2702 (c)(3); ATPA, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3202 (d)(3).
239. GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b)(2)(C); CB1, 19 U.S.C § 2702 (b)(4); ATPA, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3202 (c)(4).
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Third, all three programs require the beneficiary to adhere to WTO
commitments or their equivalent; 24° international expropriation and com22
'
pensation standards; ' international intellectual property standards; 1
and "internationally recognized workers rights;, 243 and to recognize arbitral awards.2 " Both the ATPA and CBI add extradition treaty
requirements. 245 Most egregiously, the ATPA conditions benefits on cooperation with US anti-narcotic efforts.4 6
In most respects, conditionality as currently employed by the U.S. is
not justifiable under a theory of justice as fairness. If inequalities must
be justified according to the difference principle, and trade preferences
are the mechanism to do so, then any conditions to those preferences
must themselves be consistent with justice as fairness. That means that
conditions must contribute to the benefit of the least advantaged state,
i.e., the recipient, and not to the benefit of the most advantaged, or
granting, state.
Although one can frame arguments for certain conditions in terms of
their benefit to the least advantaged, they remain problematic. One might
argue, for example, that conditions involving recognition of workers'
rights, protection of foreign investment and intellectual property, and
recognition of arbitral awards, might be justifiable under rule of law
considerations as contributing to a more well-ordered society on the part
of the beneficiary, or to the more effective realization of the distributive
goals of the policy. However, the nature of these conditions suggests that
the policy actually protects the interests of the granting state (its capital,
intellectual property, competing workers and arbitral awards). Moreover,

240. The CBI and the ATPA condition preferences on "the degree to which such coun-

try follows the accepted rules of international trade provided for under the WTO Agreement
and the multilateral trade agreements." 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (c)(4); 19 U.S.C. § 3202 (d)(4), Since

the GSP program is open in principle to countries which are not WTO members, there is no
identical requirement, although the GSP statute achieves an equivalent effect by conditioning
benefits on assurances of "equitable and reasonable" U.S. market access. Also, the GSP statute specifies that the beneficiary will refrain from unreasonable export practices (a la the
GATT), provision of adequate and effective intellectual property protection (a la TRIPS), a
reduction in trade-distorting investment practices (a laTRIMS), and a reduction or elimination

of barriers to trade in services ( a la the GATS). 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (c)(4-6).
241. GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b)(4); CBI, 19 U.S.C § 2702 (b)(2); ATPA, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3202 (c)(2).

242. GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (c)(5); CBI, 19 U.S.C § 2702 (b)(5), (c)(9-10); ATPA, 19
U.S.C. § 3202 (c)(5), (d)(9-10).
243. GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b)(2)(G); CBI, 19 U.S.C § 2702 (c)(8); ATPA, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3202 (c)(7).
244. GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b)(2)(E); CBI, 19 U.S.C § 2702 (b)(3); ATPA, 19 U.S.C.

§ 3202 (c)(3).
245. CBI, 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (b)(6); ATPA, 19 U.S.C. § 3202 (c)(6).
246. 19 U.S.C. § 3202 (d)(l1l).
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the morality of using benefit programs for coercion, even if in service of
laudable goals, is questionable.247
However, with regard to other conditions it would be difficult even
to frame a plausible argument that the policies are imposed with the recipient's benefit in mind. Conditions such as cooperation with US
narcotics efforts, extradition commitments, and eschewal of communism
do not further ensure that the benefits of inequality flow to the least advantaged. Rather, they clearly relate to the domestic and foreign policy
agendas of the granting state. 248 To refuse preferences on the basis of a
failure to meet such conditions is to directly subvert the moral principle
which justifies the international trading system.
2. The Problems of Unilateralism
Taken together, the shortcomings in U.S. preferential trade practice
described above suggest more than simply a policy in need of tinkering:
they suggest a fundamental failure on the part of U.S. policy makers to
grasp the moral implications of inequality and the normative role of special and differential treatment. One finds at almost every point a
limitation or subversion of the basic principle of justification by virtue of
benefit to the least advantaged. Instead, one sees that, despite the undeniable fact that some developing country exports do benefit from
preferential access, the policy casts preferential access in an unstable and
coercive form, limits access where it might do the most good, and manipulates access to further unrelated grantor goals. Thus from a
normative point of view, it can be said that the U.S. has not in fact implemented special and differential treatment in its preferential trade
practice, and that U.S. trade relations are consequently unjust to that extent.249
247. See supra note 220.
248. As such, they are deeply resented by beneficiary states. See, e.g., supra notes 164165, 171, and materials cited therein.

249. It can be objected that the difference principle is not an "end-state" principle, in the
sense that any move in the direction of increasing benefits to the least advantaged increases
the justice of the underlying relationships to that degree. It would therefore be unfair on this
view to characterize U.S. GSP practice as unjust or a failure-every item that enters duty-free
represents a step towards justice. While there is a core of pragmatic sense to this objection
(something is better than nothing to the one receiving it), I believe this argument does not
adequately address the underlying normative aspect of the problem. In justice as fairness, the

criterion for evaluating a social structure has to be the consistency of that structure with the
principles of justice, and not whether the structure in fact happens to confer some benefit upon
the least advantaged. The features of U.S. preferential trade practice criticized above are not

consistent with the difference principle because they are not designed to put the advantages of
the richer state in service of the poorer one. In this sense, U.S. policy is not just, and this injustice is not ameliorated because the policy happens to do some good.
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This suggests two things: first, that the acknowledged failure of GSP
programs is at bottom a moral failure. Taking the U.S. as an example,
the shortcomings of U.S. policy are traceable to failures to structure
preferential access in accord with the appropriate normative criteria. A
moral overhaul of preferential trade practice, in accordance with the difference principle, would create a more effective aid policy that would
also greatly enhance the justice of the trade relationships involved. The
similarity between the normative critique and persistent developing
country complaints about GSP suggests that the developing world does
grasp both the moral basis of preferential trade, and the strictures that
this moral basis places upon the acceptable contours of preferential trade
practice.
The second implication of this analysis is that, because of its central
role in justifying trade relationships, preferential trade should not be left
to the vagaries of unilateral implementation. Many if not all of the
shortcomings of U.S. preferential trade practice can be traced to the fact
that the current form of GSP gives granting states virtually unlimited
room to manipulate the granting of preferences and exposes GSP to the
vagaries of domestic interest group politics. 21° These shortcomings also
suggest that the domestic pressure to manipulate the grant of preferences
is too strong to resist. Put another way, the fact that preference programs
are based on legislative decisions gives domestic economic and foreign
policy interest groups and their representatives ample -opportunity to
skew resulting legislation towards protectionist or nationalistic ends.
This suggests that if, as this Article has argued, the principle of special and differential treatment is a necessary response to the moral
obligations of wealthier states, then it must be implemented in the form
of binding, essentially unconditional, treaty obligations. While this can
be accomplished bilaterally, the more likely avenue for such a comprehensive structural modification would be regional or multilateral trade
agreements, and it is to such agreements that we now turn.
B. Implementing Formal Commitments:
WTO and FTAA Agreements
If special and differential treatment must be implemented at the
treaty level to be fully effective, then current practice with respect to
those aspects of special and differential treatment already in treaties

250. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, U.S. Resists Bid to End Tariffs for 3rd World, N.Y.

TiMES, Apr. 9, 2000 at I (Clinton opposes World Bank call for permanent duty free status for
LDC's for fear it would arouse political opposition to, other trade measures, including the
China PNTR bill).
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raises two issues of concern: the challenge of negotiating appropriate
implementation of normative commitments, and the need to be prepared
to pay for the support needed for their successful implementation. A
failure at either step hinders the effectiveness of the principle, thereby
undermining the justice of the trading system.
1. Negotiating Market Protection in the WTO
Developing countries continue to emphasize the importance of the
WTO's recognition of special and differential treatment as a foundation
for their successful participation in the multilateral trading system.25 '
However, problems in the implementation of the principle in existing
WTO agreements, and the specter of new negotiations in sensitive
sectors such as agriculture, have led developing countries to call for
particular attention to the effectiveness of this principle in action.
Existing WTO Agreements do incorporate the principle of special and
differential treatment, primarily with regard to the various marketprotection mechanisms necessary to ensure that economic inequalities do
not turn trade liberalization into predation.5 Developing countries
question, however, whether the market protection aspects of special and
differential treatment have been adequately observed as applied.",

251. G-77 Ministers, supra note 3, at para. 10 ("We are convinced of the need for differential and more favorable treatment of developing countries.").
252. Developing countries have signaled that they will fight hard for adequate incorporation of special and differential treatment in the new negotiations on trade liberalization in
agriculture. Seattle Failure Threatens Concessions for Developing Countries,
www.insidetrade.com/secure/seattle-special28.asp, (December 10, 1999). Agriculture raises
particular difficulties for predominantly agrarian and small island developing countries. G-77
Ministers, supra note 3, at para. 6. Continued commitment to extensive agricultural subsidies
on the part of the EU, for example, has hurt developing countries, whose competitive advantage on key commodities exports is thereby nullified. See Cairns, U.S. Agree on-Agriculture;
Some Developing Nations Also on Board, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1969 (Dec.1, 1999)
(noting that Brazil blames EU subsidies for depressing commodity prices and creating global
hardships for farmers).
253. Seattle Failure Threatens
Concessions for
Developing
Countries,
www.insidetrade.com/secure/seattle-special28.asp, (December 10, 1999) ("The principle of
special and differential treatment should be reviewed and strengthened to take account of the
changing realities of world trade and of globalized production...").
254. See generally OAS Trade Unit, "Special and Differential Treatment in International
Trade," SG/TU/WG.SME/DOC.I/Rev. 1, 6-18 (Feb. 5, 1996) ("Special and Differential
Treatment in the WTO"); see also GATT Committee on Trade and Development, "A Description of the Provisions Relating to Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round
Agreements," COM.TD/W/510 (Nov. 2, 1994).
255. "In particular, the special and differential provisions in the WTO [multilateral trade
agreements], many of a "best endeavor" nature, which have largely remained unimplemented,
must be operationalized if the developing countries are to derive the expected benefits." G-77
Ministers, supra note 3, at para. 5.
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A critical issue of concern to developing countries in recent
multilateral fora has been the inadequacy of current implementation
periods in various WTO agreements, including agreements on traderelated investment measures, 256 customs valuation, 257 and intellectual
property. 211 In general these agreements follow the principle of
reciprocity in mandating equal standards for both developed and
developing countries alike.259 While reciprocity of obligations indicates a
move away from special and differential treatment, differential
implementation periods reestablish such treatment insofar as they protect
smaller economies during the transition period by giving them adequate
time to adjust for the fuller competition ahead. The WTO agreements in
question follow the principle of non-reciprocity with regard to
implementation periods, granting developing countries longer periods of
time (in general, five more years) to fully realize the obligations
established by the agreements.260 However, developing countries argue
that the additional time granted has proven to be insufficient for
implementation of the required domestic law reforms.
This problem raises an important issue for the political implementation of any principle of justice, namely the relationship between moral
obligation and political accommodation. The fact that these agreements
do incorporate the principle of non-reciprocity, in the form of longer
implementation periods, is evidence of some commitment on the part of
developed WTO members to the principle of special and differential
treatment. However, concrete details such as the duration of the longer
implementation period are resolved through some form of political bargaining, involving the usual range of cross-sectoral horse-trading
characteristics of multilateral trade negotiations, creating difficult compromises between what is deemed morally necessary and what is found
politically possible.
As a result, one cannot infer from the simple fact that additional time
was allowed, nor from the extent of additional time established by

256. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr.15, 1994, WTO Agreement Annex 1A.
257. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement Annex 1A [hereinafter"Customs Valuation Agreement].
258. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC [hereinafterTRIPS Agreement].
259. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, Articles3-4.
260. The TRIMS agreement gives developing countries five years to comply with the
agreement, versus two years for other members. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, art. 5(2), (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS]. See also TRIPS, art. 65 (1994); Customs
Valuation Agreement, art. 20 (1994).
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negotiation,26' that the resulting agreement incorporates that degree of
market protection sufficient to justify the trade relationship. To the
contrary, it should be inferred from developing country objections that
the agreements in fact do not.
In response, the U.S. and others point out that several WTO agreements do contain provisions recognizing that the additional time granted
developing countries for implementation of their commitments may
prove inadequate.262 Such provisions authorize individual countries to
request additional time by petitions showing cause, and developing
countries have in many cases done so. Developing country concerns,
however, go farther than individual complaints by individual countries
regarding individual provisions or agreements, asserting more generally
that the .principle of special and differential treatment was not in fact
adequately incorporated into these agreements. To paraphrase in Aristotelian terms, the contention is that unequals have not been treated with
sufficient inequality.263
This is not merely an argument about time-it goes to the heart of
the justice of the agreements in question. If, as has been argued, the
principle of special and differential treatment is key to the justification
of inequality, then adequate implementation of the principle and its
components, such as non-reciprocity, is equally important for the creation of a just trading system. The justice of the resulting international
trading system is compromised when trade agreements fail in practice to
sufficiently incorporate the mechanisms that justify underlying inequalities.
What should be done? For Seattle, the developed members of the
WTO had assembled a package of concessions for developing countries
designed to address these concerns,' 6 which failed to be enacted along
with the rest of that ministerial's agenda. The Seattle Concessions do
state as a general matter in the preamble that WTO members are committed to making all areas of special and differential treatment
operational. 265 However, developing country spokespersons have been
261. Developing countries had in fact sought much longer implementation periods, in
some cases as long as 20 years. See Cherie Taylor, Trade and Development in the WTO
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
262. See, e.g., Customs Valuation Agreement, Annex 111.1 (1994) ("The five-year delay
in the application of the provisions of the Agreement by developing country members provided for in paragraph I of Article 20 may, in practice, be insufficient for certain developing
country Members.")
263. See generally Aristotle, supra note 12, at 402-04.
264. Seattle Failure Threatens Concessionsfor Developing Countries, www.insidetrade.com/
secure/seattlespecial28.asp, at 4 (Dec. 10, 1999).
265. Id.
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critical of this package of concessions for inadequately addressing issues
of critical concern with regard to the effectiveness of special and differential treatment in existing agreements.
To begin with, the Seattle Concessions do not include additional
time• 266for the majority of agreements of concern to developing countries. The draft does suggest additional time for compliance with the
Customs Agreement, as well as additional time for particular measures
within other agreements. 26' However, the Concessions do not include
additional time for compliance with TRIPS, an area of vital concern for
developing countries and one in which the problem of inequality has
significant repercussions. 161
Moreover, the Concessions reject the systemic approach to additional time advocated by developing members. It is of particular concern
that the U.S. has gone on record as strongly opposed to any "blanket
exemptions" for developing country implementation obligations.269
However, the case-by-case approach advocated by the U.S. at Seattle is
inadequate both because it ignores the negotiating history of these provisions and because it fails to recognize the normative implications of the
objections.
To begin with, the agreements already embody an across-the-board
approach to non-reciprocity, granting in general five additional years for
implementation. The original five year period can thus be understood as
the result of an across-the-board negotiation, resulting in an across-theboard grant of such additional time as was politically acceptable at that
point. Objecting now to an across-the-board extension ignores this history. In contrast, a single blanket extension of three additional years, for
example, would represent a proposal to modify the treaty in a manner
identical to the approach already represented by the agreements themselves.
Seen in this light, the U.S. counter-proposal to take an ad-hoc approach now appears to represent a deviation from the status quo
represented by the agreements. Moreover, the case-by-case approach,
considering additional time on a country by country, agreement by
agreement, and provision by provision basis, puts developing countries
266. See Seattle Failure Threatens Concessions for
www.insidetrade.com/secure/seattle_special28.asp, at 2-4 (Dec. 10,
267. See Seattle Failure Threatens Concessions for
www.insidetrade.com/secure/seattle_special28.asp, at 2-4 (Dec. 10,

Developing Countries,
1999).
Developing Countries,
1999).

268. U.S. opposition to additional time for TRIPS implementation is particularly suspect, because of the significant self-interest at stake for U.S. and other intellectual propertyexporting states.
269. United States Wants Developing Countries to Live Up to WTO Commitments as
Agreed, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1872 (Nov. 17, 1999).
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at a maximum disadvantage, by isolating them in individual negotiations
with powerful countries like the U.S., which bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the. divide-and-conquer approach of colonial
administration.
Instead, developed members should agree to grant additional time
across the board for compliance as a matter of ensuring that WTO
270
agreements that are just in principle remain just in implementation.
Recalling the distinction between formal and substantive equality, developed members have an obligation to ensure that in practice
developing members' inequalities have been considered in such a way
that they can effectively meet their obligations. Developing countries
have together declared that, as a systemic problem, they cannot adequately meet their obligations without further time. Their complaint
should therefore be approached in the same spirit, as evidence that the
agreements have proven, in practice, to inadequately incorporate the
principle of special and differential treatment.27 '
Failure to properly respond will mean that, as inadequate implementation periods; expire, developing countries will find themselves
subject to panel proceedings and possible trade sanctions that will not be
justifiable and will therefore render the trading system more unjust. At a
minimum, WTO members should agree on a moratorium on challenges
against developing countries not in compliance until the issue is considered fully by the various committees involved."' Issues such as this,
which call into question (at least for the developing world) the basic justice of the WTO system, merit full and serious consideration outside the
shadow and constraint of pending dispute settlement proceedings.

270. It can of course be objected that such a deferential approach would invite protectionist abuses, an objection that must always be considered in structuring trade obligations.
However, in this case there are good reasons why such an objection should not stand in the
way of an across-the-board extension. First of all, it must be recalled that the non-reciprocity
of implementation periods as a principle has already been accepted in the agreements, despite
the risk that during such time protectionist interests would benefit by this non-reciprocity.
Second, several agreements already accept the concept of extending additional time, and thus
perforce any risks involved. Essentially this approach poses no new risks not already accepted
by the parties themselves as worth taking in view of the needs and interests at stake both at the
time of the agreement and the present.
271. Alternatively, where individual WTl'O agreements do provide for the grant of additional time, the requirement that cause be shown should be interpreted along the "selfdeclaration" lines under which developing country status itself is chosen. If self-designation is
acceptable as a method for choosing development status in the WTO, it is not clear why that
should not also be the case where additional time is sought on development grounds, particularly where the states in question have taken a united position on the problem.
272. Seattle Failure Threatens Concessions for Developing Countries,
www.insidetrade.com/secure/seattle-special28.asp, at 2 (December 10, 1999).
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Understanding special and differential treatment as key to
establishing just trade relationships with developing countries should
prompt developed WTO members to view such concerns as enhancing
their own ability to more effectively discharge their moral obligations to
developing members. As befits the leading international economic
"constitution," it is critical that WTO practice be at the forefront of
implementing a just trade law through incorporation and application of
the principle of special and differential treatment throughout WTO
agreements. Moreover, given that resistance to such requests on the part
of developed members was a.major factor in the failure to agree on the
agenda for the Seattle Ministerial,7 it is clear that the failure to
recognize the justice of developing country demands will remain a
stumbling block to further development of the world trading system.
2. Paying for Technical Assistance: The
FTAA Regional Integration Fund
In addition to the trade liberalization conducted at the multilateral
level through the GATI/WTO system, regional trading systems continue
to operate, often at a more advanced level of liberalization and integration, particularly with respect to developing countries and inequality
problems. If the FTAA succeeds, then current U.S. trade preference programs for this hemisphere will phase out and FTAA obligations will take
over. This means that the justice of the future hemispheric trade regime
will depend on the strength of the FTAA's commitment to special and
differential treatment. Given the early state of FTAA negotiations, any
evaluation must perforce be tentative. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the Working Group"7 give us some indication of strengths and
problem areas in creating an FTAA capable of establishing just trade
relationships in this hemisphere.
The Working Group's programmatic recommendations incorporate,
albeit on a limited basis, the principles of special and differential treatment as a key components of a program to address the concerns of

273. "WTO Preparations Still Stalled Over Agriculture as Talks on Agenda Flounder,"
16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (11/17/99) (reporting that agenda negotiations stalled on agriculture and implementation period extension issues).
274. The Working Group's interim and final reports adopt various reports and studies,

and incorporate their findings, together with the deliberations of the Working Group, into an
overall program to facilitate the integration of smaller economies into the FTAA. See generally Summary of the Eighth Meeting of the Working Group on Smaller Economies, Oct. 1416, 1997, [hereinafterFinal Report on Smaller Economies], reprintedin 4 AMERICAS TRADE,

Oct. 30, 1997, at 5-6.
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smaller economies participating in an eventual FTAA.275 In general, the
Working Group adopts the principle of special and differential treatment
with regard to longer implementation periods and not to different levels
of obligation.276 For example, in the objectives for the Market Access
Group, the market protection element of special and differential treatment is recognized in the provision for negotiation of different trade
liberalization timetables. 2" However, WTO experience cautions us to
withhold final judgement until experience demonstrates whether or not
the principle of special and differential treatment has in fact been adequately incorporated into the agreements.
Successful implementation of special and differential treatment in an
eventual FTAA will depend in part on adequate provision for the necessary technical assistance. Unless smaller economies are given access to
the specialized expertise necessary to implement trade commitments and
exploit the opportunities afforded by special and differential treatment,
then participation in the trading regime will continue to pose grave risks
for smaller economies, making the justification afforded by special and
differential treatment remain an abstraction.
In this respect, the FTAA experience suggests that smaller economies will encounter difficulties in securing access to technical assistance
because of the reluctance on the part of wealthier states to help pay for
it. The San Jose Declaration does affirm that the Negotiating Groups
shall be guided by the general principles and objectives for negotiation
of the FTAA listed in Annex I to the Declaration, which include a call
for systemic inclusion of technical assistance needs in the work of all
negotiating groups. 27' However, the San Jose Declaration fails to include
any mention of a Regional Integration Fund, a glaring omission in view
275. In general, suggested provisions include the following: technical assistance in areas
such as intellectual property and technical standards; simple and transparent rules of origin
and customs documents; longer implementation periods for trade liberalization commitments;
the possibility of implementation of certain obligations, such as technical standards, at regional or subregional levels to save resources; and a general effort to reduce transition costs
and minimize internal dislocation in smaller economies.
276. This is consistent with the trend in the WTO, in NAFA, and in other contemporary North-South integration schemes towards full reciprocity of substantive obligations. See
supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
277. Costa Rican Ministerial Declaration, supra note 40, at annex II. In contrast, the

objectives of the Services Group are silent on the issue of special and differential treatment,
no doubt because of the acute sensitivity of this sector for developed country services exporters, and smaller economies concerned over the loss of any nascent services industry.
Nevertheless, this group'sstated objectives do at least include that the Group ensure the integration of smaller economies into the FTAA process. The possibility is left open for some sort
of non-reciprocity in the levels of services sector liberalization commitments as in the
NAFTA.
278. Id. at annex I, General Principle (h), (i).
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of the fact that the need for such a Fund was studied and vigorously debated by the Working Group. The importance of such a fund was raised
quite directly by a World Bank report analyzing the need for funding
sources for technical assistance and technical assistance-related adjustment measures.2 79 The Regional Integration Fund Report appears to have
engendered some controversy, and the Working Group referred the
matter to the vice-ministerial level for further work on the technical and
"political" levels.28 °
When viewed as an element of justice, the fact that FTAA parties
have not been able to agree on the need for a mechanism to fund technical assistance raises questions concerning their commitment to "deliver"
on the promise of an agreement which in practice establishes a more just
relationship between the hemisphere's wealthier and poorer states. This
may simply be the result of the preliminary state of negotiations, and the
tendency to defer more difficult issues until later in the negotiation process. Alternatively, it may signal an unwillingness to make the difficult
political decisions involved in creating and paying for a fully just trade
policy, despite the normative imperatives for doing so.

CONCLUSION

Understanding the problem of trade and inequality as a problem of
justice has several implications for both discourse and policy. Whatever
one's view as to the appropriate answer to these questions, simply understanding the trade and inequality link as a justice issue implies that
we are not free to govern our economic relationships with developing
countries solely with regard to the politics of the moment. It becomes
incumbent on those seeking to establish an economic order that does not
fully address the claims of less developed states, to articulate a normative basis for this position. In other words, they must explain why such
an order would be just.

279. A Regional Integration Fund of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, U.N. Eco-

nomic Commission for Latin American Countries, U.N. Doc. LC/R.1738 (1998). The
report does not address a mechanism for development assistance outside of the technical

assistance area, arguing that such aid should be funneled through established financial
institutions. Id. at 7.
280. Final Report on Smaller Economies, supra note 274, at para. 6-10. Reference for
further work at "an appropriate political level" reflects the controversy over direct aid pro-

grams, even where such aid is clearly tied to technical assistance. It appears likely that such
work had simply not advanced to the consensus stage in time for inclusion in the San Jose
Declaration. Moreover, there is no mention of a negotiating group or special committee to

focus on the formation of such a fund.
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Moreover, viewing the trade and inequality link as a justice matter
renders it problematic to adopt the stance of an egalitarian liberal at
home, and a libertarian or political realist abroad. If one is an egalitarian
liberal on domestic issues of justice, then the logic of one's position
would dictate that one commit to some form of distributive justice on an
international plane as well. This conclusion is reinforced by the degree
to which trade with poorer countries has in fact been part of the wealthcreation that sustains the domestic economy's success. As Beitz puts it,
[I]f participation in economic relations with the needy society
has contributed to the wealth of the "nearly just" regime, its domestic "justice" seems to lose moral significance. In such
situations, the principles of domestic "justice" will be genuine
principles of justice only if they are consistent with principles of
justice for the entire global scheme of social cooperation.28 '
Finally, analyzing the problem of inequality as a problem of justice
means that international trade law must continue to incorporate a robust
form of the difference principle. The key to a Rawlsian justification of
international trade law is to see the disparities in market power and expertise between states as manifestations of the problem of inequality.
International trade law must therefore be structured so as to put the
power of developed country markets and knowledge at the service of the
least developed countries.
In fact, international trade law already includes elements that can be
understood as redistributive mechanisms, therefore forming a key part of
the normative justification of international economic law: the principle
of special and differential treatment, and the related practice of traderelated technical assistance. Together these can be seen as mechanisms
which, if fully implemented, can justify international economic inequalities according to a theory of justice as fairness.
However, an examination of U.S. preferential trade practice, which
ostensibly reflects the principle of special and differential treatment, reveals serious problems in the model of implementation through
unilateral GSP-type programs. A principal recommendation of this Article is that special and differential treatment be restructured so wealthy
states commit themselves in a treaty context to complete, unconditional
preferential access to all export products of smaller economies.
A brief examination of certain aspects of multilateral and regional
special and differential treatment practice suggests, however, that formalizing the principle in the form of treaty commitments is not by itself

281. Beitz, supra note 20, at 150.
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enough to guarantee a just trading system. Special and differential treatment commitments must be structured so that in practice they perform
the market access and market protection functions necessary to the discharge of their normative role. This means careful attention to issues
such as the length of differential implementation periods, and the manner in which such periods are negotiated and, if necessary, renegotiated.
Moreover, there must be adequate provision for technical assistance, and
technical assistance funding, such that smaller economies can develop
the expertise necessary to take full advantage of these critical opportunities.
This Article has argued that current U.S. trade policy has severe
shortcomings with regard to special and differential treatment, and WTO
and FTAA efforts are problematic as well. The reforms to multilateral,
regional and bilateral trade policy outlined above would more fully justify the existing international economic system, and ensure that
international trade law serve as an effective vehicle for developing a just
global order.

